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ABSTRACT 
This study exammes and compares the protection of shareholder rights contained in 
corporate governance codes in select countries around the world. Corporate governance 
codes are meant to provide shareholders with protection against expropriation. These 
codes are typically non-binding and are self regulatory in most countries with the 
requirement to disclose if any deviations are made. Governance codes are categorized 
into four distinct systems: the Anglo-Saxon System (USA, Canada, UK and Australia), 
the Germanic System (Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, 
Norway and Finland), the Latin System (France, Italy, Spain and Belgium), and the 
Japanese System (Japan). This study reviews and compares the codes of ten countries 
within the four systems identified to determine the level of protection provided to 
shareholders. 
Shareholder rights examined in this paper include the one share one vote rule, the ability 
to access information prior to the shareholders meeting, the requirement for corporations 
to provide agenda items with relevant documentation on their websites, the ability of 
shareholders to add items to the agenda, the ability of shareholders to nominate board 
and/or director positions, mechanisms for proxy voting and other provisions which 
provide protection for minority shareholders. The results of this study suggest 
shareholder rights are more protected by legislation in countries characterized by 
'widely-held' firms and less protected under governance codes. On the contrary, 
shareholder rights are typically less protected by legislation in countries characterized by 
'ultimately-owned' firms and more protected under governance codes. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Corporate Governance Codes 
Many prolific corporate scandals have occurred around the world. In the US there were 
scandals involving Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco; in Europe there was Skandia, Parmalat 
and Swissair; and in the Netherlands there was Ahold. In light of these scandals there 
has been an ongoing movement towards the establishment of standardized Corporate 
Governance Codes (O'Shea 2005). Corporate Governance Codes provide a set of rules, 
guidelines and/or best practices (for a country) for the behaviour of directors of 
corporations, and act primarily as a protective measure to avoid potential conflicts of 
interest and subsequent scandals. Codes are typically non-binding and are self-
regulatory in most countries with the requirement to disclose when and if any deviations 
are made. This is known as the "apply or explain" principle. These codes include best 
practices for board composition, selection, remuneration, and audit and information 
disclosure in order to protect the interests of shareholders. 
Sixty-two countries currently have a set of publicized Corporate Governance Codes. 
Adoption of Corporate Governance Codes seems to have gained momentum since the 
year 2000, with eighty-five percent (85% or fifty-two) of the sixty-two countries 
adopting codes of governance after the year 2000 (See Table 1 below for the first ten 
countries to adopt codes and the complete listing in Appendix I- Corporate Governance 
Codes Around the World). 
T bl 1 F" t T C t . t Ad t C d a e - Irs en oun nes 0 OPI o es 
Corporate First Year 
Country Governance Code 
System Established 
United Kingdom Anglo-Saxon 1992 
Canada Anglo-Saxon 1994 
South Africa N/A 1994 
Australia Anglo-Saxon 1995 
France Germanic 1995 
pan-Europe Anglo-Saxon 1995 
Spain Latin 1996 
Japan Japanese 1997 
The Netherlands Germanic 1997 
United States Anglo-Saxon 1997 
According to the study by Jeroen Weimer and Joost C. Pape (1999), "A Taxonomy of 
Systems of Corporate Governance", governance codes can be categorized into four 
systems: the Anglo Saxon System (USA, Canada, UK and Australia), the Germanic 
System (Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Norway and 
Finland), the Latin System (France, Italy, Spain and Belgium), and the Japanese System. 
(Japan). This classification of codes has also been identified by scholars such as Scott 
(1985), DeJong (1989), Moerland (1995, a,b) and Reaz and Mohammed, (2007). A 
'system' refers to country-specific framework of legal, institutional, and cultural factors 
through which stockholders and stakeholders can influence managerial behaviours (Reaz 
and Mohammed, 2007). These four systems originate from relatively rich and 
industrialized countries (Reaz and Mohammed 2007). This division of systems is used as 
a basis for comparison in this paper. 
Corporate governance (codes) exists for one reason and one reason alone: to ensure 
shareholders' values, as informed by knowledgeable agency, are transformed into 
company performance (Carver 2007). Codes are meant to provide shareholders with 
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protection from expropriation but, according to Carver (2007) in his article "The Promise 
of Governance Theory: Beyond Codes and Best Practices", codes and piecemeal 
improvements serve a purpose, but are insufficient to engender superior or even adequate 
corporate governance. It is more beneficial to minority shareholders to have code 
material shifted into the regulatory arena for assurance of protection. There is a 
guarantee of regulatory compliance under the legislation, whereas corporate governance 
codes promote an honour system or an adoption of a best practice system. 
1.2 Widely Held vs. Controlled Corporations 
In their book "The Modem Corporation and Private Property", authors Adolph Berle and 
Gardiner Means claimed that corporations in the United States were widely held by small 
shareholders (La Porta et al. 1999). This resulted in the separation of ownership and 
control and created agency problems between owners (shareholders) and directors 
(managers). Control was vested in a board of directors who hired managers with the 
delegated authority to manage the company and therefore, shareholders were unable to 
exert any direct influence over management (La Porta et al. 1999). In response to this, 
and to many corporate scandals occurring in the late 1990's and early 2000's, corporate 
governance codes have been developed to mitigate the agency problems inherent in this 
system as a means to protect the rights of shareholders. 
More recent studies have discredited this 'widely held' viewpoint. La Porta et al. ( 1999) 
found that relatively few firms are actually widely held. This is in direct contrast to Berle 
and Means' image of the modem corporation (which was primarily indicative of US 
3 
corporations). Outside the United States the presence of multiple large shareholders is 
very common (Gianfrate, 2007). Large publicly traded companies in Canada are 
typically owned by wealthy families who possess the majority of voting rights (Bozec 
and Laurin 2008). Germany is also typical of the world as a whole in that most large 
listed German companies have a large controlling shareholder (Edwards and 
Weichenrieder 2004). 67.48% of Italian trusts are family-owned with controlling 
shareholders (Gianfrate 2007). These findings are evidence that Berle and Means version 
of the widely held corporation is not the norm in the current globalized economy. 
The agency problems suggested by Berle and Means resulted in conflicts between owners 
and managers. There is question about who is monitoring the controlling shareholder 
among corporations that are owned by a controlling shareholder. The agency problem 
becomes an issue of conflict between the controlling shareholder and any minority 
shareholders. A controlling shareholder has the potential means to expropriate wealth 
from minority shareholders (Bozec and Claude 2008) by paying themselves a higher 
salary (should the controlling shareholder also actively participate in management), by 
exploiting business relations between the company and other firms that are wholly owned 
by the company (through transfer pricing or investments at favourable rates) (Edwards 
and Weichenrieder 2004) or by making suboptimal investment decisions (Bozec and 
Claude 2008). 
Pyramidal structures are another means of expropriation as they allow family owned 
corporations unlimited access to retained earnings of a firm it already controls (Almeida 
2006) for potential use in further acquisitions. Therefore, in firms owned by controlling 
4 
shareholders such as in family or state owned firms, there is the question of the protection 
of minority shareholder rights. This typically arises because minority shareholders have 
little incentive to monitor their firms, creating a free-rider problem, which makes these 
minority owners more vulnerable to expropriation by the controlling owners (Nam and 
Nam 2005). The many corporate scandals that occurred after the year 2000, as noted 
above, have driven corporate governance in the area of board independence and audit 
committees. Are governance codes providing adequate protection of minority shareholder 
rights, however? 
1.3 Shareholder Rights 
A corporation ' s shareholders, regardless of whether it is 'widely held' or 'controlled' are 
typically entitled to these basic rights: to vote at any meeting of the shareholders, to 
receive any dividends declared by the corporation, and to receive the remaining property 
of a corporation upon dissolution (Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP 2007). Some 
countries, like the United States, Canada and Japan, also enable investors to sue for 
wrongful acts. These rights can be significantly modified, or altered, in a 'controlled ' 
corporation when there is limited protection for minority shareholders, however. This 
'modification' is demonstrated in pyramid structures, dual-class shares, or other 
deviations from the one share, one vote structure resulting in a discrepancy between the 
voting rights and cash flow rights of majority shareholders. 
What other means of protection are available to shareholders? The trend in the Anglo-
Saxon system has been towards the implementation of strict independence requirements 
(for board members and audit committees); in the Germanic, Latin and Japanese systems 
5 
there has been the added emphasis on enhanced communications with shareholders, 
resulting in provisions to enhance shareholders ability to add agenda items for the annual 
meeting, and to nominate and/or to elect board members in some countries. There is an 
apparent need for a well designed shareholder access regime, as current literature would 
suggest (Bebchuk 2003). 
1.4 Definitions 
Board Rights - The number of seats reserved and/or controlled by each shareholder 
(Gianfrate 2007) 
Cash Flow Rights - The fraction of a portfolio company' s equity value that different 
shareholders have a claim to (Gianfrate 2007). 
Civil Law (legal system) - In this legal system a judge is bound by code and not by 
precedent as with the common law system (Yates 2006). The legal systems in many civil 
law countries are based around one or several codes of law, which set out the main 
principles that guide the law (Wikipedia Online 2008). 
Common Law (legal system) - Common law is a system of law derived from England 
where a judge looks to prior case law (precedent) to base their decision(s) on. 
Determining law through following precedent in a legal decision is referred to as stare 
decisis (Yates 2006). 
Controlling Shareholder - A majority shareholder owning > 50% of the total voting 
shares in a company. 
6 
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Dual-class Shares - Dual-class shares are issued for a single company with varying 
classes which indicate the different voting rights and dividend payments. 
Management Rights - The explicit right to appoint the CEO, Chairman, Honorary 
Chairman or Vice Chairman of a company (Gianfrate 2007). 
Minority Shareholder - A minority shareholder is a shareholder owning less than 50% 
of the total shares in a company. 
Pre-emptive Rights - The privilege of a stockholder to maintain a proportionate share of 
ownership in a corporation by purchasing a proportionate share of any new stock issued. 
Proxy Vote - Proxy voting is the delegating of a members power to vote to another 
member so that they can vote in his/her absence, according to Wikipedia. 
Shareholder - A shareholder, according to Mallin 2004, is 'an individual, institution, 
firm, or other entity that owns shares in a company.' 
Shareholder Activism- Shareholder activism is when shareholder(s) use an equity stake 
in a corporation as a means to influence management decisions. Proxy battles, publicity 
campaigns, litigation and negotiations with managements are examples of shareholder 
activism. Black (1997) defines shareholder activism as proactive efforts to change firm 
behaviour or governance rules. 
Stakeholder - A stakeholder can be any individual or group of individuals impacted by a 
corporation (company). Various stakeholders include the shareholders, employees, banks, 
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suppliers, customers, government, communities, and environmental groups that are 
potentially impacted or influenced by the activities of a company. 
Voting Rights - The rights to control or make corporate decisions. Voting rights 
measure the percentage of votes that shareholders have to affect corporate decisions 
within the shareholders assembly (Gianfrate 2007). 
1.5 Importance of this Study 
The purpose of this study is to examine shareholder rights, contained in corporate 
governance codes, in terms of their ability to influence management. Management can 
be influenced through the addition of agenda items at the shareholders annual meeting, 
the appointment of board members, and improving shareholders access to information. 
Shareholder protection is contained in the corporate governance codes of ten countries 
within the four corporate governance systems: the Anglo-Saxon (shareholder) system, the 
Germanic (stakeholder) system, the Latin system and the Japanese system. (Shareholder 
rights are also contained in legislation, but because regulatory requirements are 
nationalistic they are not within the scope of this paper). A first order comparison will be 
at the block level, for those rights that are contained in the code, in order to identify 
trends in the provisions for shareholder rights and the treatment of minority shareholders 
(in each country code within each block). A higher order of comparison will be amongst 
the four blocks. 
8 
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1.6 Study Objectives 
1. To determine ifthere are similarities in the provisions for the protection of 
shareholder rights in the governance codes within the countries identified in each 
block (i.e.: Anglo-Saxon countries will all have similar minority shareholder 
rights). 
2. To determine if there are similarities in the provisions for the protection of 
shareholder rights in the governance codes between each block (i.e.: Treatment of 
minority shareholders in the Anglo-Saxon system will vary from the treatment of 
minority shareholders in the codes in the Latin system). 
1.7 Research Scope (Sample Size) 
There are currently sixty-two corporate governance codes throughout the world. This 
study will compare and contrast shareholder rights and the treatment and/or protection of 
minority shareholder rights as contained within four corporate governance systems: the 
Anglo-Saxon system, the Germanic system, the Latin system and the Japanese system. A 
sample of three countries from each system is used for the purpose of this comparative 
study (with the exception of the Japanese system where there is only one code). The 
countries were selected based on their size and relevance to each system. I tried to 
include the most important countries within each system while maintaining a realistic 
scope of study. 
9 
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1.8 Hypothesis 
Based on my review of the literature and of the ten corporate governance codes, there 
appeared to be a correlation between ownership structure and the types of provisions 
contained in the corporate governance codes. Therefore, in terms of corporate 
governance codes around the world, my hypothesis is as follows : 
H1. I expect that provisiOns for shareholder rights in countries characterized by 
'majority held' firms are contained within their governance codes. 
H2. I expect that provisions for shareholder rights in countries characterized by 
'widely held' firms are not contained within their governance codes. 
This paper is organized as follows . Chapters 2 through 4 present the relative literature on 
corporate governance, ownership structures and shareholders rights respectively. 
Research methodology is presented in Chapter 5 and empirical results follow in Chapter 
6. The paper comes to a close in Chapter 7 with conclusions and limitations of this 
study. 
10 
I 
Chapter 2 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
2.1 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is a practice that deals with the concerns that one or more parties 
involved with organizational decision-making may not behave in the best interest of the 
organization and associated parties (Reaz and Mohammed 2007). According to the 
OECD, corporate governance involves the relationships between a company's 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders (Holmes 2006). The 
article "A Simple Aim and a Single Board", attributes the growth of corporate 
governance to the failure of law-making systems to cope with corporate development 
(Owen 1994). It is apparent, given the highly publicized scandals of corporate giants like 
Enron, Tyco, WorldCom and Parmalat, that there is a need for a credible regulatory 
mechanism (Reaz and Mohammad 2007). The separation of ownership and 
management interests is the focus of corporate governance (Reaz and Mohammad 2007). 
The purpose of corporate governance codes is to propose guidelines, principles and 
practices to help foster healthy corporate cultures (Dey et al. 2005) and to further protect 
shareholders. Corporate governance practices have a significant impact on a country's 
economic prosperity and the confidence of worldwide investors (Detomasi 2006). 
2.2 International Corporate Governance Codes 
Universal standardized codes of corporate governance do not exist; however, amidst a 
growing recognition of sound governance, different countries are addressing the issue of 
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corporate governance from various angles (Reaz and Mohammed 2007, Becht et al. 
2005) through the issuance of corporate governance codes. Sixty-two countries do 
currently have corporate governance codes. Although there are some commonalities 
amongst the codes, and literature indicates there is an increasing conformity 
internationally in the models and mechanisms relied on for corporate governance (Collier 
and Zaman 2005), there are distinct differences. Other literature outlines the dichotomous 
distinctions between corporate governance systems (codes) (Heugens and Otten 2007) as 
shareholder verses stakeholder models. One of the sharpest distinctions among business 
systems is in terms of the market, or shareholder, economies of the Anglo-American 
countries and the coordinated, or stakeholder economies typified by Germany and Japan 
(Heugens and Otten 2007). 
Authors Heugens and Otten (2007) attempt to develop a fine-grained taxonomy of 
corporate governance logistics in their article "Beyond the Dichotomous Worlds 
Hypothesis: Towards a Plurality of Corporate Governance Logics". They refer to codes 
as an 'authoritative document with 'soft-law' status which outlines a comprehensive 
series ofreforms or plainly speaking 'documents of inspiration'. However, their findings 
are that "none of the investigated corporate governance systems can be classified as 
purely shareholder or stakeholder-oriented." Corporate governance systems differ 
dramatically between nations with regards to their purpose, structure and function 
(Detomasi 2006). There is no single governance style followed around the world, though 
one can see that four divergent systems have emerged, based on common core principles 
(Pape and Weimer 1999; Reaz and Mohammed 2007). These four global governance 
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systems are: the Anglo-Saxon System, the Germanic System, the Latin System and the 
Japanese System. Each system provides different levels of protection to its shareholders 
and minority shareholders alike. 
2.3 Anglo-Saxon System 
The Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance emphasizes the relationship between 
shareholders (the owners) and directors (the managers) (Pape and Weimer 1999; Mallin 
2004). The corporate objective in this system is the maximization of shareholder wealth. 
The shareholder model is predominately found in countries with common law systems 
which inherently protect the rights of shareholders through legislation: the US has 
protection embodied in the Securities Exchange Act (1934), the Securities Investor 
Protection Act (1970), and the Insider Trading Sanctions Act ( 1984) just to name a few 
(Pape and Weimer 1999); in Canada shareholder protection is embodied in Canada's 
Business and Corporations Act (2007 /2008); and the UK has the Company Securities Act 
(1985, revised 1989), the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers and the Financial 
Services Act ( 1986) (Pape and Weimer 1999). Board structure in the Anglo-Saxon 
system is one-tier and comprised of both executive and non-executive board members, 
which are appointed and dismissed at the annual shareholders meeting (Pape and Weimer 
1999). 
The shareholder in the Anglo-Saxon system can exert substantial influence over 
managerial decisions with the democratic principle of 'one share, one vote' . Stock 
markets play a much more active role in the Anglo-Saxon system than in other countries 
(Pape and Weimer 1999). Key metrics used are market capitalization and new equity 
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capital raised through public offerings as a percentage of the Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation (GFCG) (Paper and Weimer 1999). Ownership concentration is typically very 
low and according to the OECD ( 1997) the largest five shareholders in the UK and the 
USA hold an average of 20 to 25% of outstanding shares (Reaz and Mohammed 2007). 
In Canada, however, large publicly traded companies are typically owned by wealthy 
families (Bozec and Laurin, 2008). Another key aspect of this system is the active 
external market for corporate control known as the 'takeover market' (Pape and Weimer 
1999). Mergers, tender offers, proxy fights and leveraged buy-outs are seen to act as a 
discipline on firm's management. This takeover corporate governance mechanism is less 
evident in non-Anglo-Saxon countries (Pape and Weimer 1999). 
2.4 Germanic System 
The Germanic system is based on the stakeholder model of governance that views 
companies as partnerships between capital and labour (Mallin 2004). Pape and Weimer 
(1999) refer to this system as 'autonomous corporate governance' with various 
stakeholders exerting influence over managerial decision-making. The corporation in the 
Germanic System is not seen as a device to create shareholder value (Pape and Weimer 
1999). This system is characterized by a two-tier board system, comprised of a 
management board and a supervisory board, which provides separation of management 
and the supervision of management (Pape and Weimer 1999). The one share one vote 
principle is not applicable in most countries in the Germanic system of governance (Pape 
and Weimer 1999). Concentrated ownership is most common in the Germanic System as 
documented by the OECD (1997), and the largest five shareholders hold 41% of the 
outstanding shares (Reaz and Mohammed 2007). This ownership structure enables 
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shareholders to directly influence managerial actions. Large banks are very influential 
stakeholders in Germanic corporations and hold large share blocks, unlike in the USA 
where such a practice is illegal. (Reaz and Mohammed 2007) 
Shareholders are less protected by legislation in the Germanic System than in the Anglo-
Saxon system. Countries in this system are able to list non-voting shares, limiting the 
voting power of individual shareholders. This lack of protection for minority 
shareholders has been recently addressed in Germany, however, with their revised 
corporate code (Cromme Code 2007) that explicitly states: "each share equals one vote" 
and furthermore that "no shares with multiple voting rights, preferential voting rights 
(golden shares) or maximum voting rights are tolerable". Whether or not other 
countries within this system follow suit is yet to be seen. The Netherlands, Switzerland 
and other countries have the ability to limit the power of shareholders through other 
protective measures (Pape and Weimer 1999). The stock market plays a less active role 
in the Germanic system and it is rare to find a market for corporate control (Reaz and 
Mohammed 2007). 
2.5 Latin System 
The concept of the firm m Latin countries is somewhere between the Anglo-Saxon 
shareholder view and the Germanic stakeholder view, but is likely closest to the 
Germanic system (Pape and Weimer 1999). There is the option of a one-tier or two-tier 
board system; though a majority of firms have gone to the unitary system. Shareholders 
have the ability to both appoint and dismiss board members under the unitary system but 
require 50% majority of the voting rights to enforce this action (Pape and Weimer 1999). 
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Shareholders have more influence in the Latin system than in the Germanic System 
because shareholder sovereignty is an important concept; however their influence is not 
as decisive as in the Anglo-Saxon System (Pape and Weimer 1999). Directors can be 
removed by shareholders, at will, under the principle of revocabilite ad nutum in the 
French corporate system. The one share one vote principle is not applicable in the Latin 
system. The influence of shareholders in the Latin countries is characterized by financial 
holdings, cross-shareholders, government control and family control (DeJong 1989, 
Moreland 1995(a)). In France and Spain, for example, shareholding by banks is as 
important and as common as in Germany, yet Italy is somewhat similar to the Anglo-
Saxon system where shareholding by banks is not common practice (Reaz and 
Mohammed 2007). The stock market plays a lesser role in the economy in the Latin 
System than the Anglo-Saxon system. However, there have been more hostile takeovers 
in this system then in the Germanic (Reaz and Mohammed 2007). Ownership 
concentration is relatively high in France, Italy and Spain with the percentage of shares 
controlled by the five largest shareholders on average 48% in France and 87% in Italy 
(Pape and Weimer 1999). 
2.6 Japanese System 
The cultural dimension of corporate governance is more predominant in Japan than any 
of the other systems we have looked at (Pape and Weimer 1999). Sense of 'family' and 
the importance of achieving consensus are vitally important in Japanese business culture. 
There is little emphasis placed on litigation in Japan (Reaz and Mohammed 2007). 
Family values pervade all characteristics of the Japanese governance system (Pape and 
Weimer 1999). The concept of keiretsu, or the large-scale presence of corporate 
16 
networks, is very prevalent in Japan. Japanese board systems are complex, featuring a 
board of directors, an office of representative directors and an office of auditors, each of 
whom have different responsibilities (Pape and Weimer 1999). There are some Anglo-
Saxon traits within the board structure as the resulting board consists of both inside 
directors and outside members, which de facto resembles the one-tier board system (Pape 
and Weimer 1999). 
Salient stakeholders in the Japanese system resemble the Germanic system with 
employees, shareholders, and Japanese banks playing critical roles and exerting much 
influence over management (Reaz and Mohammed 2007). Share ownership in Japan 
represents long-term business ties, the acquisition of new customers and the warding off 
of unwelcome outsiders (Pape and Weimer 1999). Stock markets play an important role 
in Japan's economy and the Japanese stock market is the oldest in Asia (Reaz and 
Mohammed 2007); however there is no active market for corporate control (Pape and 
Weimer 1999). The ownership structure is marked by stable crossholdings between 
financial and non-financial companies, and ownership is therefore more widely dispersed 
than in the Germanic system and more concentrated than the United States (Reaz and 
Mohammed 2007). 
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Chapter 3 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES 
3.1 Widely Held Firms 
Ownership structure is also a category within governance codes. Authors Adolph Berle 
and Gardiner Means (1932) claimed that corporations in the United States were widely 
held by small shareholders in their book "The Modem Corporation and Private 
Property". Control was vested in a board of directors who hired managers with delegated 
authority to manage the company and therefore, shareholders were unable to exert any 
direct influence over management (La Porta et al. 1999). This resulted in the separation 
of ownership and control and created agency problems between owners (shareholders) 
and managers. In response, corporate governance codes have been developed in order to 
mitigate the potential agency problems inherent in this system and to protect the rights of 
shareholders. 
More recent studies have discredited this 'widely held' viewpoint. La Porta et al. (1999) 
found that relatively few firms are actually widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means 
image of the modem corporation (which was primarily indicative of American 
corporations). It is true that widely held firms are most common in countries with 
satisfactory protection: 90% of the large United Kingdom firms, 80% of the large 
American firms and 50% of large Japanese firms remain widely held; dispersed 
ownership (globally) is still rare (La Porta et al. 1999). The presence of multiple large 
shareholders is very common outside of the US (Gianfrate 2007). As previously noted, 
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in Canada large publicly traded companies are typically owned by wealthy families 
(Bozec and Laurin 2008). Many large European companies have prospered under family 
ownership which has been attributed to the view that families are committed long-term 
investors (Barontini and Caprio 2006). Germany is also typical of the world as a whole 
in that most large listed German companies have a large controlling shareholder 
(Edwards and Weichenrieder 2004). Marchica and Mura (2005) report that there is a 
decreasing trend in 'widely held' firms in the United Kingdom and in Italy 67.48% of 
trusts are family-owned with controlling shareholders (Gianfrate 2007). It is evident, in 
light of these facts, that Berle and Means' hypothesized "widely held corporation" is not 
the norm in the current globalized economy. 
La Porta et al. (1999) describe five types of 'ultimate owners' which include family or 
individual, the state, widely held financial institutions (i.e. banks, insurance companies), 
a widely held corporation, and miscellaneous (cooperatives, voting trusts, or groups 
without a single controlling investor). They further classify controlling in the terms of 
percentage of voting rights (they identify a 20% and subsequent 10% threshold). 
3.2 Family Controlled (Majority Held) 
La Porta et al. (1999) found that thirty percent (30%) of the firms in the richest countries 
were family controlled. The effect of family control in public corporations is a growing 
field of interest (Barontini and Caprio 2006). Large publicly traded companies have 
concentrated ownership worldwide (Bozec and Claude 2008, Edwards and 
Weichenrieder 2004) and in Canada, with voting rights in the hands oflarge shareholders 
(typically wealthy families). A positive viewpoint is that families are responsible 
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corporate citizens as they have a vested interested in the performance of the company. 
Families are long-term investors who are committed to the firms they invest in (Barontini 
and Caprio 2006) and are often involved with the management of the company either 
directly or indirectly by placing offspring in positions of power (CEO, Chairman, 
Honorary Chairman, Vice-Chairman) (Barontini and Caprio 2006, Bozec and Claude 
2008). There is also empirical evidence that family control equates to positive market 
valuation (Barontini and Caprio 2006, Bozec and Claude 2008, Edwards and 
Weichenrieder 2004). This is, however, dependent on the percentage of cash flow rights 
to voting rights held by the largest shareholders. Pyramidal structures and multiple 
classes of stock are two ways of separating cash flow and control rights in a firm. 
The number of shares each interest owns legally determines the ownership interests. As 
the number of shares typically equals the number of votes, majority ownership results in 
majority representation on the subsidiaries board of directors and consequently control 
over the investing, financing, and operating activities (Graham and Lefanowicz 1999). 
This puts controlling shareholders in the position to exert influence and obtain private 
benefits at the expense of minority shareholders (Edwards and Weichenrieder 2004). If 
the controlling owner participates in management and/or places family members in 
positions of power there is the possibility that they pay themselves higher salaries 
(Edwards and Weichenrieder 2004). There is also the possibility that entrenched 
management may inadvertently hinder a company's performance by possibly not having 
the 'best' management in place. Entrenchment occurs when dominant (controlling) 
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shareholders have the power to use the firm in pursuit of their own interests (Bozec and 
Claude 2008). 
3.3 Agency Problems 
Agency problems, as portrayed by Berle and Means (1932), have resulted in the conflict 
between owners and managers. There is the question, in corporations that are owned by 
a controlling shareholder, about who is monitoring the controlling shareholder. The 
agency problem becomes an issue of conflict between the controlling shareholder and the 
minority shareholder (Graham and Lefanowicz 1999). A controlling shareholder has the 
means to potentially expropriate wealth from minority shareholders (Bozec and Claude 
2008) as previously mentioned, by paying themselves a higher salary (should the 
controlling shareholder also actively participate in management), by exploiting business 
relations between the company and other firms that are wholly owned by the company 
(through transfer pricing or investments at favourable rates) (Edwards and Weichenrieder 
2004) or by making suboptimal investment decisions (Bozec and Claude 2008). 
Firms that are owned by controlling shareholders such as in family or state owned firms , 
have questions surrounding the protection of minority shareholder rights. Families may 
resort to control-enhancing devices that may ultimately reduce the value of a company 
(Barontini and Caprio 2006). La Porta et al. ( 1999) found that controlling shareholders 
had power over firms that were significantly in excess of their cash flow rights. The 
distinction between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders is at 
the centre of this agency problem (Edwards and Weichenrieder 2004). One way in which 
the ultimate owners can reduce their ownership below their control rights is by using 
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shares with superior voting rights; a second way is to organize the ownership structure of 
the firm in a pyramid; and a third way is to solidify control through cross-shareholdings-
having the firm own shares in its shareholders (La Porta et al. 1999). 
3.4 Separating Ownership from Control 
The separation of ownership from control can be accomplished structurally through 
pyramids and dual class shares which separate voting rights and cash flow rights (Bozec 
and Claude 2008, Barontini and Caprio 2006). Twenty-six percent (26%) of firms with 
controlling shareholders are controlled through pyramids which allow them to acquire 
power disproportionate to their cash flow rights (La Porta et al. 1999). Minority 
shareholders bear the full costs of such measures (enabling controlling shareholders to 
expropriate from minority shareholders). La Porta et al. (1999) identify three ways in 
which an ultimate owner can reduce their ownership below their control rights: 
1. Using shares with superior voting rights; 
2. Organizing the owners' structure of the firm in a pyramid; 
3. Solidification of control through cross-shareholdings - having the firm own 
shares in its shareholdings. 
The one share one vote rule provides minority shareholder with protection from dual-
class shares. 
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Chapter 4 
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 
4.1 Shareholder Protection (Codes and Legislation) 
The typical corporate governance framework views shareholders as principle owners and 
management as empowered to maximize shareholder wealth (Nam and Nam 2005). 
Shareholders entrust the board of directors to monitor management but should also be 
given the rights and opportunities to participate directly in monitoring their firms (Nam 
and Nam 2005). The focus on the controlling shareholders' , in family-controlled 
enterprise, should be on providing minority shareholders with effective mechanisms for 
protecting their interests from abuses by the controlling owners or management (Nam 
and Nam 2005). Some countries have developed the necessary protection of shareholder 
and minority shareholder rights through laws and contract-enforcement mechanisms 
(Graff 2006) while others are more dependent on various governance devices (such as 
governance codes) to provide sufficient protection for shareholders. La Porta et al. 
(2002) found that the main benefit of enhanced shareholder protection is the higher 
valuation of the corporation. Their finding supports the quantitative importance of the 
expropriation of minority shareholders in many countries, as well as for the quantitative 
importance for the role of law in limiting such expropriation. 
Countries vary in terms of the level of protection provided by legislation, and this is 
typically dependent on the foundation of the laws that are prevalent in that particular 
country. In a study conducted by La Porta et al. ( 1996) it was determined that the nature 
23 
and effectiveness of financial systems around the world could be traced in part to the 
differences in investor protection against expropriation by insiders. This is reflected by 
legal rules and the quality of their enforcement. Evidence indicates that legal rules 
protecting investors and the quality of their enforcement differ greatly across countries. 
Graff (2006) suggested that the legal system that countries have inherited from the past is 
crucial to the analysis of economic growth; consequently, the legal system is identified as 
one of the ultimate causes of economic development. La Porta et al. ( 1996) found, in 
terms of protection for shareholders in the area of expropriation by insiders, that common 
law countries (Anglo-Saxon) provided the best level of protection to shareholders, French 
civil law (Latin System) provided the worst level of protection and German civil law and 
Scandinavian civil law countries (Germanic System) were somewhere in the middle. 
In another study by La Porta et al. (2002), "Investor Protection and Corporate 
Evaluation", the authors discovered that when shareholder rights are protected by law, 
outside investors are willing to pay more because they recognize that better legal 
protection equates to higher returns. This is in opposition to expropriation by the 
entrepreneur controlling the firm. The legal systems that underlie, and in some cases 
support corporate governance codes are beyond the scope of this paper. See La Porta et 
al. (2002) for a comprehensive view on the relationship between legal origin (civil verses 
common law) and investor protection. This study is focused on the level of protection 
provided to shareholders under the corporate governance codes only and not under the 
joint framework of legislation and code. 
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4.2 Shareholder Rights 
OECD Principles (1999) identify basic shareholders rights as the ability to obtain 
relevant information on a timely and regular basis, to share in residual profits, to 
participate in basic decisions (participating and voting at shareholders meetings), and to 
elect board members and to fair and transparent treatment during changes of control. The 
focus of shareholders' rights in the governance of family-based corporations is on 
providing minority shareholders with effective mechanisms for protecting their interests 
from abuses by controlling owners or management (Nam and Nam 2005). The power to 
expropriate outside investors is moderated by the controlling shareholders financial 
incentives to not do so (La Porta et al. 2002). Is there more that can be done to enhance 
the rights of shareholders? Increased access to the ballot (Bebchuk 2003), the right to 
determine director's remuneration, the right to select and terminate board members, and 
to set the severance terms all enhance a shareholders ability to influence management 
decisions. However, the level of protection provided to shareholders and minority 
shareholders across the four systems differ significantly. 
This paper is mainly concerned with shareholder rights in terms of: the one share, one 
vote rule, effective participation in decision making (which includes the requirement of 
companies to provide shareholders with adequate and relevant information in a timely 
fashion, the ability of shareholders to access information prior to the shareholders 
meeting and the ability of shareholders to add agenda items), the ability to nominate and 
elect directors, the mechanisms for proxy voting and the protection of minority 
shareholder rights across the realm of the four governance systems. 
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4.3 One Share One Vote Rule 
Limited voting stock distributes voting rights to shareholders that are disproportionate to 
their cash flow rights. Variations on voting rights for common stock have been around 
since the late 1800's occurring in 1898 when International Silver Co. issued common 
stock without any voting rights (Roberts 1991 ). When Harvard University Professor 
(William L. Ripley) addressed the Academy of Political Science at their annual meeting 
in 1925, he brought to the attention of investors the effects of non-voting stock, which 
resulted in an outcry. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), as a result, prohibited the 
listing of non-voting stock (also referred to as common stock) from 1925 to 1987, as it 
reduced shareholders voting rights (Roberts, 1991 ). This policy became known as the 
one share, one vote rule (Roberts, 1991) providing shareholders with protection. In 1988, 
the SEC adopted Rule 19c-4 prohibiting listed companies from disenfranchising existing 
shareholders; however, the rule was struck down by the Court of Appeals in 1990 
(Roberts 1992). The new rules adopted in December 1994 prohibit companies listed on 
the NYSE, the AMEX, or the NASDAQ system from taking any corporate action or 
issuing any stock that has the effect of reducing or restricting the voting rights of existing 
common stock shareholders. 
Dual-class shares are highly controversial and there is current debate as to whether the 
United Kingdom should adopt the one share one vote rule that is prevalent in the United 
States (Commission of the European Communities 2007). Shares with multiple voting 
rights are used as a way for controlling shareholders to maintain control. Shareholders 
who control a proportion of total voting rights much larger than their ownership rights 
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(and therefore dividend) have an incentive to extract value from the company at the 
expense of non-controlling shareholders. Such an incentive acts as a multiplier with 
respect to the general fact that parties in control of a corporation are in a position to enjoy 
private benefits of control that do not accrue to non-controlling shareholders 
(Commission of the European Communities 2007). Separation of cash flow rights from 
voting rights impacts widely held firms and controlled firms in different ways. In the 
case of a controlling shareholder (more prevalent in the Germanic and Latin system as 
well as in Canada), the one share one vote rule promotes value-increasing control 
transfers and deters value-decreasing control transfers more effectively than any other 
vote allocation (Burkart 2007). Widely held firms, which are more prevalent in the 
Anglo-Saxon system, employ the one share one vote rule to ensure an efficient outcome 
in bidding contests, as dual-class shares mitigate the free-rider problems, thereby 
promoting takeovers (Burkart 2007). Proponents of dual-class shares say the presence of 
controlling, unlisted stock somewhat counters any short-term financial focus as 
controlling shareholders are typically in it for the long-haul and minority shareholders are 
somewhat protected; whereas others see dual-class shares as an unfair system allowing 
small groups of shareholders to retain control while others are providing the majority of 
the capital (Burkart 2007). 
4.4 Effective Participation in Decision Making 
Shareholders have a fundamental right to vote at shareholders' meetings and all 
shareholders in a given class should be treated the same way (Nam and Nam 2005). 
Shareholders typically exercise their influence at the annual shareholders meeting subject 
to legislation. According to the OECD (1999), in order to enable shareholders to 
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effectively evaluate information and participate in decision-making they require (and 
should be provided with) adequate and timely information about agenda items. 
Shareholders should also be encouraged to ask questions, make comments, and raise 
issues at meetings to be able to exert influence over management (Nam and Nam 2005). 
In the article "The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot" by Lucian Bebchuk 
(2003), the purpose of increased shareholder participation is improved performance and 
values. According to the Commission of the European Communities (2007) there is a 
general consensus in the academic, financial , and multilateral regulatory community that 
the development of financial markets is one of the key preconditions for economic 
growth, and that internal financing and bank financing should be complemented by 
strong securities markets. In tum, the functioning of the latter critically depends on 
protecting shareholders against extraction of private benefits by insiders. 
4.5 Election of Directors 
There has been heated debate in the United States over the ability of shareholders to 
access the ballot (Bebchuk 2003) and this 'right' has been coined as the 'holy grail' of 
shareholders theory (Wutkowski 2008). A shareholders inability to exert any influence 
over management is at the heart of the agency problem (Berle and Means 1932); and it 
therefore makes intuitive sense that if shareholders are able to nominate and to elect 
directors, this will significantly diminish the agency problem and put the power back into 
their hands. The election of a new team can ensure change when change is needed and 
furthermore, might provide directors with strong incentives to serve shareholder interests 
better (Bebchuk 2003). The identities and the incentives of directors are extremely 
important because the corporate law system leaves a great deal of discretion in their 
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hands to oversee the management of the corporation (Bebchuk 2003). Directors are 
empowered to block high-premium acquisition offers and to set compensation (and 
incentives) for the firms top executives (Bebchuk, 2003). The debate over the ability to 
nominate directors (proxy access) has had a long history in the United States and more 
recently in the United Kingdom. Direct proxy access could potentially bring fresh 
perspectives to the board of directors; however, there is the concern that shareholders 
may nominate directors who are potentially inappropriate for the board (Burkart 2003). 
The business community wants to keep tight control, and protect the board from special 
interests while shareholder activists consider the proxy a key element of investor rights 
(Wutkowski 2008). 
4.6 Proxy Mechanisms 
Proxy voting provides shareholders with the ability to exert their influence over 
management activities. Major deterrents should not stand in the way of shareholder 
participation in the decision making at the shareholders meetings. Shareholders unable to 
attend a shareholders meeting should be able to participate through the designation of 
proxies or voting by mail (Nam and Nam 2005). The passive role of the small investor 
and the logistical difficulty in allowing large numbers of investors to exercise their rights 
has led to the proxy system of voting in the controlling shareholder scenario (DuMoulin 
Fasken Martineau 2007). Proxy voting allows small investors to delegate their rights to 
nominees who can vote on their behalf. This system can be abused, however, and in 
many countries proxy voting is regulated by corporate statute and/or securities legislation 
(DuMoulin Fasken Martineau 2007). In the United States the SEC has recently rejected 
a plan that would have led to the opening up of the ballot for shareholders to nominate 
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directors (via proxy voting) but has suggested some innovative alternatives to g1ve 
shareholders more power through electronic shareholder forums and e-prox1es 
(Wutkowski 2008). Current technology now makes it possible for shareholders to vote 
their proxy statements via the Internet. 
4. 7 Minority Shareholder Rights 
Controlling shareholders have the ability to expropriate funds from minority shareholders 
by diverting shares of the profits from the firm prior to dividend distribution. This 
diversion can take the form of salary (when holding a management position), transfer 
pricing, subsidized personal loans, non-arms-length asset transactions and in some cases 
theft. Adequate shareholder protection can make expropriation so costly that cash-flow 
ownership hardly matters (La Porta et al. 2002). Parent expropriations may also be 
mitigated by contracts designed to strengthen minority shareholder rights (Graham and 
Lefanowicz 1999). Shareholder approval of major related-party transactions (Wutkowski 
2008), pre-emptive rights in relation to new share issues, mandatory bid requirements and 
dissenters rights are particularly important for the protection of minority shareholders 
(Nam and Nam 2005). A shareholder's access to a judicial venue to challenge the 
decisions of management, or the right to step out of the company to purchase their shares 
when they object to a fundamental change such as mergers, asset dispositions and 
changes in the article of incorporation (La Porta et al. 2002) further reduce the risk of 
expropriation. The rule of law plays an important part in the expropriation of minority 
shareholders. Typically common law countries protect minority investors better because 
corporate owners have less political influence (La Porta et al. 2002). 
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5.1 Methodology 
Chapter 5 
METHODOLOGY 
This section outlines the methodology used in determining the provisions for shareholder 
rights and the treatment and/or protection of minority shareholders in the ten country 
codes identified. This approach was utilized in order to review the various aspects of 
shareholder rights and the treatment of minority shareholder rights within each of the 
country codes identified within the four systems of governance identified. Data was 
found on the ECGI web site available at (http://www.ecgi.org) as at February 1, 2008. 
ECGI is a non-profit organization which provides up-to-date information on corporate 
governance and is a scholarly site with academic integrity (Collier and Zaman 2005). 
The site identifies all of the corporate governance codes from around the world from the 
date of conception and includes all subsequent updates. The most current version of each 
country code reviewed was utilized for this study. For countries with more than one code 
identified, the choice of code to use was determined based on a previous study (Collier 
and Zaman 2005) with the most recent version of the code utilized (Appendix I lists all of 
the sixty-two country codes). The ten corporate governance codes reviewed (the sample) 
in this study are included in Table 2 below: 
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Table 2 -Sample (Ten Country Codes Reviewed) 
:. 
': 
Country System Name of the Code Most Current 
Version 
Canada Anglo-Saxon Beyond Compliance: building 2001 
a Governance Culture 
United Kingdom Anglo-Saxon The Combined Code on 2006 
Corporate Governance 
United States Anglo-Saxon Final NYSE Corporate 2003 
Governance Rules 
Germany Germanic System German Corporate 2007 
Governance Code (The 
Cromme Code) 
The Netherlands Germanic System The Dutch Corporate 2003 
Governance Code. Principles 
of Good Corporate 
Governance and Best Practice 
provisions (Tabaksblat Code) 
Switzerland Germanic System Swiss Code of Best-Practice 2002 
Principles 
France Latin System The Corporate Governance of 2003 
Listed Corporations 
Italy Latin System Corporate Governance Code 2006 
Spain Latin System Report by the Special 2003 
Commission to Foster 
Transparency and Security in 
the Markets and in Listed 
Companies 
Japan Japanese System Corporate Governance 2001 
Principles : A Japanese View 
Based on a methodical review of the above noted codes, the OECD Principles (1999) and 
a large number of other sources (including the Taxonomy of Systems of Corporate 
Governance by Pape and Weimer 1999) which contained qualitative data, seven 
characteristics of shareholder rights emerged. These characteristics help to quantify the 
level of protection provided to shareholders in the ten corporate governance codes 
observed. The characteristics examined included the following: 
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a. One share, one vote rule (whether or not the one share one vote rule applies) 
(a) For the purpose of this paper in assessing the level of shareholder protection 
provided by country codes subscribing to the one share one vote rule it is deemed 
that shareholders would be considered well protected under this regime. In 
country codes not subscribing to the one share one vote rule it is deemed that 
shareholders are less protected. 
b. Ability to access information prior to the shareholders meeting (to determine 
shareholders ability to evaluate information and effectively participate in decision 
making) 
c. Requirement for corporations to provide agenda items with accompanying 
relevant documentation on their websites (to determine the ease of access 
shareholders have to information) 
d. Ability of shareholders to add items to the agenda (to determine the level of 
influence shareholders have on management decisions) 
(b),(c)& (d) In terms of determining whether shareholders rights are protected by 
country codes, providing shareholders with the ability to obtain and evaluate 
information in order to effectively participate in decision making it is deemed that 
the ability of shareholders to access information prior to the shareholders 
meeting (via the internet or other means of communication) and/or the ability of 
shareholders to add items to the agenda would be considered well protected. In 
country codes not providing its shareholders with the ability to obtain and 
evaluate information in this way, shareholders are considered less protected. 
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e. Ability of shareholders to nominate and/or elect board/director positions (to 
determine the level of influence shareholders have on management decisions) 
(e) In terms of shareholders rights' being protected by the ability of shareholders 
to nominate and/or elect directors it is deemed that country codes having this 
ability are considered well protected. Alternatively, country codes not having the 
ability to nominate or elect board members are considered less protected. 
f. Mechanisms for proxy voting (to determine level of encouragement for 
shareholder participation in decision making) 
(f) In terms of mechanisms for proxy voting, country codes providing 
shareholders with mechanisms for proxy voting such as website posting or other 
means are considered to be more protected (in terms of shareholder rights) than 
country codes that do not provide mechanisms for proxy voting. 
g. Provisions for minority shareholders (to determine the level of protection for 
minority shareholders) 
(g) In terms of provisions for minority shareholders, country codes providing 
shareholders with pre-emptive rights, regulatory restrictions on the use of dual-
class shares, provisions for institutional shareholders and/or a judicial venue to 
challenge the decisions of management are deemed to be more protective of 
shareholders than country codes not providing such provisions for minority 
shareholders. 
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Chapter 6 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.1 Anglo-Saxon System 
The observations of shareholder rights m corporate governance codes based on the 
prescribed factors for the countries in the Anglo-Saxon System are summarized in Table 
3 and are discussed below. 
Table 3 - Shareholder Rb~hts in An!!;lo-Saxon System 
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 
Name of Document (Code) and date of most current version (update/amendment) 
6.ta One share, one vote rule observed? 
6.1b Docs the code identify a means for shareholders to obtain and eva luate information prior to 
the shareholders meeting? 
6.Jc Does the code provide/mention recommendations to companies to li st agenda items on their 
wcbsitcs for case of access? 
6.1 d Docs the code provide shareholders with the right to put agenda items forward at the annua l 
meeting? 
6.1 e Docs the code provide shareholders with the right to nominate and/or elect board members 
at the annual general meeting? 
6.lf Docs the code provide mechanisms for proxy voting such as website posting(s) or other 
means? 
6. lg Docs the code contain any provisions for the protection of minority shareholder rights? 
6.1 g Does the code mention and/or contain provisions for institutional shareholders? 
6.1e: Docs the code contain provisions for pre-emptive rights? 
6.1e: Are there regulatory Restrictions on the use of dua l class shares? 
CANADA 
Beyond Compliance: 
Building a Corporate 
Culture 
Joint Committee on 
Corporate Governance 
November 2001 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
YES 
( 1,2) 
NO 
NO 
NO 
UN ITED KINGDOM 
The Combined Code on 
Corporate Govemance 
Financial Reporting 
Council 
Revised June 2006 
(Replaces 2003) 
NO 
*NO 
(1 .2.3.) 
NO 
NO 
NO 
YES 
(5) 
NO 
YES 
(6) 
NO 
NO 
*NO = NO MENTION YES = MENTIONED (# 's IN BRA CKETS ARE NOTES CONTAINED IN APPENDIX II) 
6.1a One Share One Vote Rule Observed 
UNITED STATES 
Final NYSE 
Corporate Governance 
Rules 
November 2003 
*NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
( 1,*) 
NO 
NO 
••No 
Under the Anglo-Saxon model the one share one vote rule is not observed under any of 
the three country codes examined. The literature suggests, however, that the United 
States does subscribe to this notion and has for well over sixty years. Neither Canada nor 
the United Kingdom currently subscribe to the 'one share one vote' notion; however, (as 
per the literature) the United Kingdom has been pushing for reform to bring the 'one 
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share one vote' principle to its twenty five member nations in order to provide this 
elevated level of protection to its investors. 
6.lb Ability to Access Information Prior to the Shareholders Meeting 
None of the three Anglo-Saxon country codes contain specific provisions to enable 
shareholders to access information prior to the shareholders meeting; however, although 
not explicitly stated, the United Kingdom's code specifies that there should be a dialogue 
with shareholders based on the mutual understanding of objectives and that the chairman 
should maintain sufficient contact with the major shareholders in order to understand 
their issues and concerns. Furthermore, it is stated that the chairman should ensure that 
the views of shareholders are communicated to the board as a whole. I have interpreted 
that this facilitates the exchange of information between shareholders and directors prior 
to the annual general meeting. 
6.1c Requirements for Corporations to Provide Agenda Items on Website 
All three Anglo-Saxon countries had similar outcomes not requiring companies to 
provide relevant information (agenda items and other relevant documents) on their 
websites within the realm of their corporate governance codes. However, the US code 
does specify that listed company 's websites must include its corporate governance 
guidelines, charters of its most important committees, and annul reports on its website to 
ensure information is available in print to promote better investor understanding. The 
ability to put items forward and to take the floor enables shareholders to exert their 
influence over management which provides shareholders with more protection from 
expropriation. 
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6.1d Ability of Shareholders to Add Items to the Agenda 
None of the three country codes under the Anglo-Saxon system contained any provisions 
for shareholders to add agenda items or to take the floor at the annual general meeting. 
6.1e Ability of Shareholders to Nominate Directors 
There are no differences in the Anglo-Saxon system country codes with regards to 
provisions for shareholders to nominate directors. Shareholders do not have this 
privilege under this regime; however, there has been ongoing debate in the United States 
for shareholders access to the ballot according to the literature. 
6.1fMechanismsfor Proxy Voting 
Neither Canada nor the United States governance codes provide mechanisms for proxy 
voting; however, the United Kingdom's combined code does. The code states that for 
each resolution a proxy appointment form is to be provided to shareholders with the 
option to direct their proxy to vote either for or against the resolution or to without their 
vote. The code further requires companies to ensure that valid proxy appointments are 
properly recorded. 
6.1g Provisions for Minority Shareholders 
Neither the United Kingdom nor the United States corporate governance codes contain 
provisions for minority shareholders; however, Canada contains explicit provisions for 
the protection of minority shareholders. The code states that companies with controlling 
shareholders must ensure minority shareholders are protected. The significant 
shareholder must be prepared to accept responsibility to ensure that proper functions of 
37 
governance are carried out. The combined code in the United Kingdom does not contain 
provisions for minority shareholders m terms of pre-emptive rights, regulatory 
restrictions on the use of dual-class shares or judicial venue. There Is, however, a 
mention of institutional investors m terms of dialogue with companies to ensure they 
carefully consider explanations for deviations from the code. Furthermore institutional 
shareholders are said to have a responsibility to make considered use of their votes and 
are encouraged to attend the annual general meeting. 
6.2 Germanic System 
The observations of shareholder rights m corporate governance codes based on the 
prescribed factors for the countries in the Germanic System are summarized in Table 4 
and are discussed below. 
T bl 4 Sh a e - are h ld Ri ht . t h G 0 er 121 SID e . s erma me ,ys em 
SHAREHOL DER RJGHTS GERMA.~Y THE SWITZERLAND 
:-IETHERLAI<DS 
Name of Document (Code) and date of most current version (update/amendment) Gcnnan Corporate The Dutch Corporate Swiss Code of Best 
Governance Code (The Governance Code Practice for Corporate 
Crommc Code) Principles of Good Governance 
Go\~rnment-endorsed Corporate Governance Joint Committee 
Commiflee and Best Practice July 2002 
Revised June 14, 2007 Provisions 
(revised annually) Corporafe Governance 
Committee 
December 9, 2003 
6.2a One share, one vote rule observed? YES NO NO 
(3) 
6.2b Does the code identify a means fo r shareholders to obtain and eva luate information prior to YES YES YES 
the shareholders meeting? (7) (9) (10) 
6.2c Does the code provide/mention recommendations to companies to list agenda items on their YES YES NO 
websites for ease of access? (7) ( 11 , 12) 
6.2d Does the code provide shareholders with the right to put agenda items forward at the annual YES NO YES 
meet in£? (6) (5) 
6.2e Does the code provide shareholders with the right to nominate and/or elect board members YES NO YES 
at the annual 2eneral meetin£? (5) (4) 
6.2f Does the code provide mechanisms fo r proxy voting such as website posting(s) or other YES •YES NO 
means? (8) (3) 
6.2g Does the code contain provisions for the protection of minority shareholder rights? YES NO NO 
(3,4) 
6.2g Does the code contain provisions fo r inst itutiona l shareholders? NO YES YES 
(13- 15) (6) 
6.2g Does the code contain provisions fo r pre-emptive rights? YES NO NO 
(4) 
6.2g Are there regulatory Restrictions on the use of dual class shares? YES NO NO 
(2) 
*NO = NO MENTION YES = MENTIONED (#"s IN BRACKETS ARE NOTES CONTA INED IN APPENDIX lll) 
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6.2a One Share One Vote Rule Observed 
The Netherlands and Switzerland do not observe the one share one vote rule. The 
German Corporate Governance Code does. The German code states that in principle, 
each share equals one vote and that no shares shall have multiple voting rights, 
preferential voting rights (golden shares), or maximum voting rights. 
6.2b Ability to Access Information Prior to the Shareholders Meeting 
All three countries reviewed in the Germanic system subscribe to the notion of providing 
shareholders with the ability to access and evaluate information prior to the annual 
shareholders meetings. The German code contains the requirement for all companies to 
post relevant information on their websites, including agenda items, to ensure 
shareholders are able to exercise their rights. The code further states that the company's 
treatment of all shareholders in terms of information must be equal and all new facts 
must be disclosed to shareholders without delay. The Dutch code states that both the 
management and supervisory board shall provide shareholders with all information it 
requires for the exercise of its powers at the annual general meeting. The Swiss code 
states that the company should use the shareholders meeting as a forum for 
communication so that it is well informed in discharging its function in decision-making. 
Companies are further required to provide concise explanations on agenda items and on 
motions put forward by the board. 
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6.2c Requirements for Corporations to Provide Agenda Items on Website 
Both the German and Dutch codes explicitly state that companies are required to post 
agenda items on the company 's webpage. In Germany, the code requires the 
management board of companies to publish the reports, documents, annual reports and 
meeting agendas on the company's internet site. It also requires companies to send out 
notifications of meetings via electronic means. The Netherlands code states that 
companies shall place on information required to be published on their websites and that 
provisions be made for shareholders to be able to follow meetings and presentations in 
real time by means of web casting or telephone with presentations presented on the 
website afterwards. 
6.2d Ability of Shareholders to Add Items to the Agenda 
Within the Germanic System, both the German and the Swiss code contain provisions for 
shareholders to exercise this right; however, the Dutch code does not mention the ability 
of shareholders to add items to the agenda. The code in Germany explicitly states that 
each shareholder is entitled to participate in the general meeting, to take the floor on 
matters on the agenda and to submit materially relevant questions and proposals. The 
Swiss code states that shareholders exercise their rights at the general shareholders 
meeting and have the right to make motions on items prescribed in the agenda. 
Shareholders also have the right to request information on company matters excluded 
from the agenda. 
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6.2e Ability of Shareholders to Nominate Directors 
Shareholders under the German and Swiss code are provided with the 'holy grail' of 
shareholder rights in terms of the ability to nominate and elect board members. This 
right enables shareholders to exert their influence over management directly which 
provides shareholders with better protection from expropriation. The German code 
states that shareholders appoint the supervisory board; however, the supervisory board 
appoints management. The Swiss code explicitly states that shareholders alone are 
entitled to make decisions with regard to personnel matters at the top of the company 
level which include the electing and granting release to members of the board of directors 
(as well as auditors) . Shareholders under the Dutch code, however, are not provided with 
this provision. 
6.2fMechanismsfor Proxy Voting 
Mechanisms for proxy voting are contained in the both the German and the Dutch code, 
but are not provided for in the Swiss code. The German code unequivocally states that 
the company shall facilitate the personal exercising of shareholders voting rights and to 
assist shareholders in the use of proxies. Shareholders are considered well protected 
under the code in terms of mechanisms for proxy voting. The Dutch code states that good 
corporate governance requires the fully-fledged participation of shareholders in decision 
making in the general meeting of shareholders. It further states that the company shall 
give shareholders the opportunity to vote by proxy and to communicate with all other 
shareholders. 
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6.2g Provisions for Minority Shareholders 
Neither the Dutch code nor the Swiss code contain specific provisiOns for minority 
shareholders m terms of the one share one vote rule, pre-emptive rights or judicial 
remedies. The German code does contain provisions for minority shareholders such as 
pre-emptive rights and restrictions on the use of dual-class shares (due to German 
subscription to the one share one vote principle). 
6.3 Latin System 
The observations of shareholder rights in corporate governance codes based on the 
prescribed factors for the countries in the Latin System are summarized m Table 5 and 
are discussed below. 
Table 5 - Shareholder Rights in the Latin System 
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 
Name of Document (Code) and date of most current version (up:latc/amcndmcnt) 
6.3a One share, one vote ru le observed? 
6.3b Does the code identify a means for shareholders to obtain and evaluate information prior to 
the shareholders meeting? 
6.3c Does the code provide/mention recommendations to companies to list agenda items on their 
websites for ease of access? 
6.3d Does the code provide shareholders with the right to put agenda items fonvard at the annual 
meetin~? 
6.3e Does the code provide shareholders with the right to nominate and/or elect board members at 
the annual general meeting? 
6.3f Does the code provide mechanisms for proxy voting such as website posting(s) or other 
means? 
6.3g Does the code contain provisions fo r minority shareholder rights? 
6.3g Does the code contain provisions for institutional shareholders? 
6.32 Does the code contain provisions for pre-emptive rights? 
6.32 Are there regulatory Restrictions on the use of dual class shares? 
FRANCE 
The Corporate 
Governance of Listed 
Corporations 
MEDEF Association 
Francoise des 
Entresprises Privees 
(AFEP 
October 2003 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
YES 
(5) 
NO 
NO 
NO 
ITALY 
Corporate 
Governance Code 
Committee for the 
Corporate 
Governance of Listed 
Companies Borsa 
l taliana 
Revised March 14, 
2006 
NO 
YES 
(2) 
YES 
(3) 
NO 
NO 
NO 
YES 
(6) 
YES 
(7) 
NO 
NO 
*NO = NO MENTION YES = MENTIONED (#'S IN BRACKETS ARE NOTES CONTAINED IN APPENDIX IV) 
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SPAIN 
Report by the Special 
Commission to Foster 
Transparency and 
Security in the Markets 
and in Listed 
Companies 
Government endorsed 
committee 
2003 
NO 
YES 
(4) 
YES 
(3) 
YES 
(4) 
NO 
YES 
(2) 
NO 
YES 
(5) 
NO 
NO 
6.3a One Share One Vote Rule Observed 
The Latin System is mostly comprised mostly of family owned corporations and none of 
the three countries reviewed subscribe to the one share one vote principle. 
6.3b Ability to Access Information Prior to the Shareholders Meeting 
The Italian and Spanish codes contain provisions for shareholders to access and evaluate 
information prior to the shareholders meeting which enable shareholders to exert their 
influence over management. This increases their level of protection from expropriation. 
The French code does not contain this provision. The Italian code states that the board of 
director's shall use its best efforts for ensuring that access to the information concerning 
the materials for shareholders is timely and easy to access, so as to allow shareholders an 
informed exercise of their rights. The Spanish code specifies that companies should 
extend the period of advance notice of the meeting to enable shareholders, subject to 
legislation, to apply to include items in the agenda and to propose alternate motions 
sufficiently in advance of the shareholders meetings. 
6.3c Requirements for Corporations to Provide Agenda Items on Website 
The Spanish and Italian codes require corporations to post agenda items and other 
relevant documentation on a company's website to enable shareholders to obtain and 
evaluate information prior to the shareholders meeting. Shareholders are then able to 
better exert their influence over the decision-making of the management team. 
Shareholders under the French system are not provided with this right. The Italian code 
requires that companies establish a specific section on its internet site that is easily 
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identified and accessed where information is available. The site must also contain 
procedures for participation, exercising of voting rights and documentation relating to the 
agenda of the shareholders meetings. The Spanish code states that the company must 
disclose the full content of all the motions to be submitted to the meeting of shareholders 
on its own web site for shareholders to access. 
6.3d Ability of Shareholders to Add Items to the Agenda 
Neither the French or Italian codes provide shareholders with the ability to include 
agenda items at the annual meetings. The Spanish code does provide shareholders with 
this right, however. The Spanish code states that shareholders have the right to apply to 
include items in the agenda of the convened meetings and the right to propose alternate 
motions sufficiently in advance of the shareholders meeting so that the board can define 
its position. 
6.3e Ability of Shareholders to Nominate Directors 
The country codes reviewed under the Latin System of governance did not contain any 
rules or recommendations on the ability of shareholders to nominate directors. This 
inability to nominate directors is disadvantageous to shareholders who are less protected 
from expropriation under this Latin system. 
6.3f Mechanisms for Proxy Voting 
Neither the French nor the Italian codes contain mechanisms or any mention of proxy 
voting. Alternatively, the Spanish code promotes active shareholder participation 
through proxy voting. The Spanish code explicitly states that the shareholders meeting 
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must provide the most efficient vehicle for such participation, enabling shareholders who 
do not attend the meeting to be represented and to voice their interests through proxy 
voting. 
6.3g Provisions for Minority Shareholders 
The French and Italian codes contain some provisions for the protection of minority 
shareholders; however the Spanish code does not. The French code specifies that 
corporations that are controlled by a majority shareholder has the responsibility to the 
other shareholders and must take particular care to avoid possible conflicts of interest, to 
secure transparency of information provided to market, and to take all interests into 
account fairly. However, there is no mention of pre-emptive rights or any restrictions on 
the use of dual-class shares. The Italian code requires minimum percentages to be fixed 
for the exercise of voting rights and the prerogatives of minorities. The Italian code also 
recommends that directors regularly assess the desirability of adapting such percentages 
in line wit the evolution of the company's size and shareholder structure. The Spanish 
code does not contain specific provisions for the protection of minority shareholders. 
There is no mention of pre-emptive rights or regulatory restrictions on the use of dual-
class shares, and the code does not promote the one share one vote rule. However, there 
is mention of institutional shareholders. The code states that facilities should be provided 
to institutional investors (mutual funds, financial institutions, or other intermediaries) 
which represent the interests of numerous shareholders and investors), to enable them to 
contribute more actively in corporate decisions. Therefore, under the code, shareholders 
are provided with some protection of minority shareholders in this regard. 
45 
6.4 Japanese System 
The observations of shareholder rights in corporate governance codes based on the 
prescribed factors for the Japanese System are summarized in Table 5 and are discussed 
below. 
T bl 6 Sh h ld Ri h a e - are 0 er 1g1 ts m t h J e apanese s system 
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS JAPAN 
Name of Document (Code) and date of most current version (update/amendment) Corporate 
Governance 
Principles: A 
Japanese View 
Japan 
Japan Corporate 
Governance Forom 
2001 
6.4a One share, one vote rule observed? NO 
6.4bDocs the code identify a means for shareholders to obtain and evaluate information prior to YES 
the shareholders meeting? (5 ,7) 
6.4c Does the code provide/mention recommendations to companies to list agenda items on thei r NO 
websites for case of access? 
6.4d Docs the code provide shareholders with the right to put agenda items forward at the annual NO 
meeti~? 
6.4c Docs the code provide shareholders with the right to nominate and/or elect board members YES 
at the annual general meeting? (2) 
6.4f Does the code provide mechanisms for proxy voting such as website post ing(s) or other NO 
means? 
6.4g Does the code contain provis ions for minority shareholder rights? YES 
(6) 
6.4g Does the code contain provisions for institutional shareholders? NO 
6.41( Docs the code contain provisions for pre-emptive rights? NO 
6.4g Are there regulatory Restrictions on the usc of dual class shares? NO 
*NO = NO MENTION YES = M ENTION ED (# 'S IN BRACKETS ARE NO TES CONTAINED IN APPENDIX V) 
6.4a One Share One Vote Rule Observed 
The Japanese Corporate Governance Principles does not subscribe to the one share one 
vote principle. 
6.4b Ability to Access Information Prior to the Shareholders Meeting 
Japan's code does contain recommendations to provide shareholders with the ability 
access to information prior to the shareholders meeting. The code states that the creation 
of shareholder value lies in continually developing good investment opportunities and in 
following through with those opportunities. Therefore, the code encourages executive 
managers to communicate with shareholders, investors and other people related with the 
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market and endeavor to create trust. Furthermore the general meeting is meant to provide 
investors with an opportunity to participate in the decision-making process, to obtain 
information about the current sate of the company and to evaluate the qualifications of 
the board. 
6.4c Requirements for Corporations to Provide Agenda Items on Website 
The code for Japan does not contain any mention of corporations providing agenda items 
on the company's website. 
6.4d Ability of Shareholders to Add Items to the Agenda 
The Japanese code does not contain any provisions pertaining to the ability of 
shareholders to add items to the agenda. 
6.4e Ability of Shareholders to Nominate Directors 
The country code in Japan does contain provisions for shareholders to nominate 
directors. The codes states that the driving force behind the economies of advance 
capitalist countries is, in general, the large public stock corporation, which is owned by a 
multitude of shareholders; because it is essentially impossible for shareholders to directly 
manage the company, shareholders appoint the board of directors who are entrusted with 
management. 
6.4f Mechanisms for Proxy Voting 
The Japanese code does not contain mechanisms for proxy voting. 
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6.4g Provisions for Minority Shareholders 
The Japanese code does mention provisions for minority shareholders in terms of 
providing a venue for litigation. The code contains recommendations for a Litigation 
Committee. A Litigation committee would be responsible for assessing whether to 
commence with litigation against directors or executives, against whom the company or 
the shareholders have made a claim, to hold them responsible for their conduct. 
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7.1 Conclusions 
Chapter 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
This qualitative study exammes whether there are similarities in the provisions for 
shareholder rights as contained in the governance codes of ten countries within four 
distinct systems: the Anglo-Saxon System, the Germanic System, the Latin System and 
the Japanese System. I hypothesized provisions for shareholder rights in countries 
characterized by 'majority held' (concentrated ownership) would be contained within 
their governance codes. I further hypothesized provisions for shareholder rights 
characterized by 'widely held ' firms would not be contained within their governance 
codes. My findings indicate that there are similarities in the provisions for the protection 
of shareholder rights in each system in most instances, but there are also some variances 
from the norm. 
In the Anglo-Saxon System provisiOns for shareholder rights were not explicitly 
contained in the corporate governance codes of any of the three countries reviewed. In 
Canada however, the governance code did contain a provision for minority shareholder 
protection. Controlling shareholders in Canada (as contained in the code) are expected to 
accept responsibility to ensure proper governance is carried out to protect minority 
shareholders. The countries in the Anglo-Saxon System are typically governed under a 
common law system which provides more protection under legislation for its 
shareholders. These findings are consistent with my hypothesis. Canada is characterized 
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by more 'majority held' firms and therefore the provisions for shareholder protection are 
contained within their code; whereas the United States and the United Kingdom are 
characterized by more 'widely held' firms and the provisions for shareholder protection 
are absent from their codes. 
The countries reviewed under the Germanic System contained more provisions in their 
codes for the protection of shareholder rights compared to the codes in the Anglo-Saxon 
System; however, there were variations in the provisions within each country. Countries 
under this system are typically governed under a civil law system which provides less 
protection for shareholders (as discussed in the literature). These findings are also 
consistent with my hypothesis. The countries in the Germanic system are characterized 
by 'majority held' firms and therefore provisions for the protection of shareholder rights 
are contained within their governance codes. Similarly, the Latin System contained 
provisions for the protection of shareholder rights within the corporate governance codes 
of all three countries reviewed: Spain, Italy and France. However, there were fewer 
provisions than in the countries under the Germanic System. The Latin System is 
governed under civil law and is mostly comprised of family owned corporations. 
Therefore these findings are also consistent with my hypothesis. 
Japan's corporate governance code contained provisions for the protection of shareholder 
rights, but they were fewer than in either the Germanic or Latin Systems. In terms of 
ownership concentration, ownership in Japan is more dispersed than the Germanic 
System and more concentrated than the Anglo-Saxon system. Therefore, in terms of the 
hypothesis, Japan is a bit of an anomaly. 
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7.5 Limitations of the study 
This study was conducted based on the protection of shareholder rights as contained 
under the framework of corporate governance codes only. A further in-depth review of 
the legislation to determine the true level of shareholder protection under the joint 
framework of the codes and legislation would be pertinent. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I - Corporate Governance Codes Around the World 
Listing of Governance Codes Around the World 
Most 
Year Recent Updated Stock 
Count!}: Issued Revision Code Reference !Name) Provenance Annual!~ Exchange 
Argentina 2004 2004 C6digo de Mejores Practicas de Gobiemo de las In Spanish Unknown 
Organizaciones para Ia Republica Argentina 
Australia 2003 2007 Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Stock Exchange ASX No Yes 
Practice Recommendations 
Austria 2002 2007 Austrian Code of CorporateGovernance Austrian Working Group for Yes No 
Corporate Governance 
Bangladesh 2004 2004 The Code of Corporate Governance for Bangladesh Bangladesh Enterprise lnstititute Unknown No 
(BEl) 
Belgium 2004 2004 Belgian Corporate Governance Code Corporate Governance Committee No No 
Brazil 1999 2004 Code of Best Practice of Corporate Governance Institute Brasileiro de Govemanca No No 
Corporativa 
Bulgaria 2007 2007 Bugarian National Code for Corporate Governance The Bulgarian Stock Exchange Unknown Yes 
Canada 2001 2001 Beyond Compliance: building a Governance Culture Joint Committee on Corporate No No 
Governance 
China 2001 2004 The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies China Securities Regulatory No Yes 
in China Commission 
Cyprus 2002 2006 Cyprus Corporate Governance Code (2nd edition, March Cyprus Stock Exchange No Yes 
2006) 
Czech Republic 2001 2004 Corporate Governance Code based on the DECO Czech Securities Commission No Yes 
Principles (2004) 
Denmark 2001 2003 The Norby Committee's report on Corporate Governance Copenhagen Stock Exchange; No Yes 
in Denmark; becoming Report on Corporate Governance becoming CSE Committee on 
in Denmark Corporate Governance 
Estonia 2006 2006 Corporate Governance Recommendations Financial Supervision Authority Tall in No Yes 
Stock Exchange 
Finland 2003 2003 Corporate Governance Recommendations for Listed HEX Pic, Central Chamber of No No 
Companies Commerce of Finland; Confederation 
of Finish Industry Employers 
France 2003 2003 The Corporate Governance of Listed Corporations MEDEF Association Francaise des No No 
Entresprises Privees (AFEP) 
Germany 2002 2007 German Corporate Governance Code (The Gramme The Governanment Commission on Yes No 
Code) the German Governance Code 
Greece 1999 1999 Principles in Caporale Governance in Greece: Committee on Corporate Governance No No 
Recommendations for its Competitvie Transformation in Greece 
Hong Kong 2004 2004 Hong Kong Code on Corporate Governance Stock Exchange of Hong Kong No Yes 
Hungary 2002 2007 Corporate Governance Recommendations Budapest Stock Exchange No Yes 
Iceland 2004 2005 Guidelines on Corporate Governance 2nd Edition Iceland Stock Exchange; Iceland N/A Yes 
Chamber of Commerce; SA-
Confederation of Icelandic Employers 
India 2000 2000 Report on the Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee on Securities and Exchange Board of No No 
Corporate Governance India (SEBI) 
Indonesia 2000 2007 Code of Corporate Governance National Committee on Governance Yes No 
Ireland 1999 1999 Corporate Governance, Share Option and Other Irish Association of Investment No No 
Investment Schemes Managers 
Italy 2002 2006 Corporate Governance Code Committee for the Corporate No No 
Governance of Listed Companies, 
Borsa ltaliana 
Jamaica 2005 2006 Code on Corporate Governance Private Sector Organization of No No 
Jamaica 
Japan 1997 2001 Corporate Governance Principles: A Japanese View Japan Corporate Governance Forum No No 
Kenya 2002 2002 Principles for Corporate Governance in Kenya Private Sector Corporate Governance No No 
Trust 
Latvia 2005 2005 Principles of Corporate Goverance and Recommendations Riga Stock Exchange No Yes 
on their Implementation 
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Most 
Year Recent Updated Stock 
Count!}: Issued Revision Code Reference (Name) Provenance Annual!~ Exchanse 
Lebanon 2006 2006 Corporate Governance Code for Small and Medium Lebanese Transparency Association No No 
Enterprises (SME's) (LTA) 
Lithuania 2003 2003 Corporate Governance Code for the Companies listed on National Stock Exchange of Lithuania No Yes 
the National Stock Exchange of Lithuania 
Luxembourg 2006 2006 The Ten Principles of Corporate Governance of the Luxumbourg Stock Exchange No Yes 
Luxembourg Stock Exchange 
Macedonia 2003 2003 White Paper on Corporate Governance in South·Eastem Macedonia Corporate Governance No No 
Europe and Company Law Project 
Malaysia 2000 2007 Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance Securities Commission Malaysia No No 
Malta 2001 2005 Principles of Good Corporate Governance: Revised for Malta Financial Services Authority No No 
Issuers of Listed Securities (MFSA) 
Mexico 1999 1999 The Corporate Govemanc Code for Mexico Mexican Stock Exchange No Yes 
New Zealand 1994 1994 Corporate Governance in New Zealand: Principles and The New Zealand Securities No Yes 
Guidelines Commission 
Nigeria 2006 2006 Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria Central Bank of Nigeria No No 
Norway 2004 2007 The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Norwegian Corporate Governance No No 
Governance Board 
Pakistan 2002 2002 Code of Corporate Governance (Revised) The Securities and Exchange No Yes 
Commission of Pakistan 
Peru 2002 2002 Principles of Good Governance for Peruvian Companies National Supervisory Commission of No No 
Company Securities 
Poland 2002 2002 The Corporate Governance Code for Polish Listed The Polish Corporate Governance No No 
Companies (The Gdansk Code) Committee 
Portugal 1999 2003 Recommendations on Corporate Governance Joint Committee on Corporate 
Governance 
Romania 2000 2000 Corporate Governance Code in Romania International Centre for No No 
Entreprenuerial Studies, University of 
Bucharest 
Russia 2002 2002 The Russian Code of Corporate Conduct The Co-ordination Council for No No 
Corporate Governance 
Singapore 2001 2005 Code of Corporate Governance 2005 Douncil on Corporate Disclosure and No No 
Governance (CCDG) 
Slovakia 2002 2002 Corporate Governance Code (Based on the OECD Bratislava Stock Exchange No Yes 
Principles) 
Slovenia 2004 2007 Corporate Governance Code Ljubljana Stock Exchange No Yes 
South Africa 1994 2002 King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa lnstitue of Directors in Southern No No 
2002 (King II Report) Africa 
South Korea 1999 1999 Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance Committee on Corporate Governance No No 
Spain 2003 2003 Report By the Special Commission to Foster Transparency Government-endorsed committee No No 
and Security in the Markets and in Listed Companies 
Sri Lanka 2006 2006 Draft Rules on Corporate Governance for Listed Institute of Chartered Accountants of No Yes 
Companies Sri Lanka (ICASL) and Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Sri lanka 
(SEC) 
Sweden 2001 2007 Swedish Code of Corporate Governance The Swedish Corporate Governance No No 
Board 
Switzerland 2002 2002 Swiss Code of Best-Practice Principles Swiss Business Federation No No 
Taiwan 2002 2002 Taiwan Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles Taiwan Stock Exchange No Yes 
2002 
Thailand 1998 1998 The SET Code of Best Practice for Directors of Listed The Stock Exchange of Thailand No Yes 
Companies 
The Netherlands 2003 2003 The Dutch Coprorate Governance Code. Principles of Corporate Governance Committee No No 
Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice provisions chaired by Mr Morris Tabaksblat 
(Tabaksblat Code) 
The Phillipines 2000 2000 lCD Code of Proper Practices for Directors Institute of Corporate Directors No No 
Trinidad and Tob 2006 2006 Corporate Governance Guideline Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago No No 
Turkey 2003 2003 Corporate Governance Principles The Capital Markets Board of Turkey No No 
Ukraine 2003 2003 Ukrainian Corporate Governance Principles Ukrainian Securities Commission No No 
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s 
ch
oi
ce
 a
nd
 t
he
 b
as
is
 f
or
 t
he
 d
et
er
m
in
at
io
n 
in
 i
ts
 a
nn
ua
l 
pr
ox
y 
st
at
em
en
t 
or
 c
om
pa
ny
's
 
an
nu
al
 r
ep
or
t.
 
C
on
tr
ol
le
d 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 m
us
t 
co
m
pl
y 
w
it
h 
th
e 
re
m
ai
ni
ng
 s
ec
ti
on
s.
 
2)
 
L
is
te
d 
co
m
p
an
y
's
 w
eb
si
te
s 
m
us
t 
in
cl
ud
e 
its
 c
or
po
ra
te
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
gu
id
el
in
es
 a
nd
 t
he
 c
ha
rt
er
s 
o
f 
it
s 
m
os
t 
im
po
rt
an
t 
co
m
m
it
te
es
 (
in
cl
ud
in
g 
at
 l
ea
st
 t
he
 a
ud
it
, a
nd
 i
f 
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
, 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
an
d 
no
m
in
at
in
g 
co
m
m
it
te
es
).
 
E
ac
h 
co
m
pa
ny
's
 a
nn
ua
l 
re
po
rt
 o
n 
F
or
m
-K
 f
ile
d 
w
it
h 
S
E
C
 m
us
t 
st
at
e 
th
at
 t
he
 f
or
eg
oi
ng
 i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
is
 a
va
il
ab
le
 o
n 
it
s 
w
eb
si
te
, 
an
d 
th
at
 t
he
 i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
is
 a
va
il
ab
le
 in
 p
ri
nt
 t
o 
an
y 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r 
w
ho
 r
eq
ue
st
s 
it.
 
M
ak
in
g 
th
is
 i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
pu
bl
ic
ly
 a
va
il
ab
le
 s
ho
ul
d 
pr
om
ot
e 
be
tt
er
 i
nv
es
to
r 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
o
f t
he
 c
o
m
p
an
y
's
 p
ol
ic
ie
s 
an
d 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
, a
s 
w
el
l 
as
 m
or
e 
co
ns
ci
en
ti
ou
s 
ad
he
re
nc
e 
to
 t
he
m
 b
y
 d
ir
ec
to
rs
 a
nd
 m
an
ag
em
en
t.
 
*U
S 
do
es
 fo
ll
ow
 t
he
 o
ne
 s
ha
re
 o
ne
 v
ot
e 
ru
le
 b
ut
 i
t 
is
 n
ot
 e
xp
li
ci
tly
 s
ta
te
d 
in
 t
he
 c
od
e 
**
N
Y
SE
 a
n
d
 A
m
e.
x 
ha
ve
 m
ad
e 
re
vi
si
on
s 
to
 t
he
 v
ot
in
g 
ri
gh
ts
 o
f c
om
m
on
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
no
t m
en
ti
on
ed
 in
 t
he
 c
ur
re
nt
 c
od
e 
w
hi
ch
 h
av
e 
m
ov
ed
 a
w
ay
 fr
om
 o
ne
 s
ha
re
 o
ne
 v
ot
e 
to
 a
 
m
or
e 
di
se
nf
ra
nc
hi
si
ng
 s
ys
te
m
. 
A
p
p
en
d
ix
 Il
l 
-
N
o
te
s 
on
 t
he
 G
er
m
an
ic
 S
ys
te
m
 
G
E
R
M
A
N
Y
 N
O
T
E
S
: 
I)
 
G
er
m
an
 c
od
e 
pr
es
en
ts
 e
ss
en
ti
al
 s
ta
tu
to
ry
 r
eg
ul
at
io
ns
 f
or
 t
he
 m
an
ag
em
en
t a
nd
 s
up
er
vi
si
on
 (
go
ve
rn
an
ce
) 
o
f G
er
m
an
 l
is
te
d 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 a
nd
 c
on
ta
in
s 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
ll
y 
an
d 
na
ti
on
al
ly
 r
ec
og
ni
ze
d 
st
an
da
rd
s 
fo
r 
go
od
 a
nd
 r
es
po
ns
ib
le
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e.
 
2)
 
S
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
ex
er
ci
se
 t
he
ir
 r
ig
ht
s 
at
 t
he
 G
en
er
al
 M
ee
ti
ng
 a
nd
 v
ot
e 
th
er
e.
 
3)
 
In
 p
ri
nc
ip
le
, e
ac
h 
sh
ar
e 
eq
ua
ls
 o
ne
 v
ot
e.
 
T
he
re
 a
re
 n
o 
sh
ar
es
 w
ith
 m
ul
ti
pl
e 
vo
ti
ng
 r
ig
ht
s,
 p
re
fe
re
nt
ia
l 
vo
ti
ng
 r
ig
ht
s 
(g
ol
de
n 
sh
ar
es
) 
or
 m
ax
im
um
 v
ot
in
g 
ri
gh
ts
. 
4)
 
W
he
n 
ne
w
 s
ha
re
s 
ar
e 
is
su
es
, s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
ha
ve
 p
re
-e
m
pt
iv
e 
ri
gh
ts
. 
5)
 
M
em
be
rs
 o
f t
he
 s
up
er
vi
so
ry
 b
oa
rd
 a
re
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
 a
t 
th
e 
an
nu
al
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
m
ee
ti
ng
; 
In
 e
nt
er
pr
is
es
 w
it
h
>
 5
00
 o
r 
20
00
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
in
 G
er
m
an
y,
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
ar
e 
al
so
 r
ep
re
se
nt
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
S
up
er
vi
so
ry
 b
oa
rd
 w
hi
ch
 i
s 
th
en
 c
om
po
se
d 
o
f e
m
pl
oy
ee
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
es
 t
o 
1/
3 
or
 Y
, 
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
. 
6)
 
E
ac
h 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r 
is
 e
nt
it
le
d 
to
 p
ar
ti
ci
pa
te
 in
 t
he
 G
en
er
al
 M
ee
ti
ng
, t
o 
ta
ke
 t
he
 f
lo
or
 o
n 
m
at
te
rs
 o
n 
th
e 
ag
en
da
 a
nd
 t
o 
su
bm
it
 m
at
er
ia
ll
y 
re
le
va
nt
 q
ue
st
io
ns
 a
nd
 p
ro
po
sa
ls
. 
7)
 
T
he
 M
an
ag
em
en
t B
oa
rd
 s
ha
ll 
pu
bl
is
h 
th
e 
re
po
rt
s 
an
d 
do
cu
m
en
ts
, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
e 
A
nn
ua
l 
R
ep
or
t,
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
by
 l
aw
 f
or
 t
he
 G
en
er
al
 M
ee
ti
ng
 in
 a
n 
ea
si
ly
 a
cc
es
si
bl
e 
w
ay
 o
n 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
's
 i
nt
er
ne
t 
si
te
 t
og
et
he
r 
w
it
h 
th
e 
ag
en
da
. 
T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 s
ha
ll
 s
en
d 
no
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
 o
f t
he
 m
ee
ti
ng
 b
y 
el
ec
tr
on
ic
 m
ea
ns
 i
f t
he
 a
pp
ro
va
l 
re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
 a
re
 f
ill
ed
. 
8)
 
T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 s
ha
ll
 f
ac
il
it
at
e 
th
e 
pe
rs
on
al
 e
xe
rc
is
in
g 
o
f s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
vo
ti
ng
 r
ig
ht
s.
 
T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 s
ha
ll
 a
ls
o 
as
si
st
 t
he
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
in
 t
he
 u
se
 o
f p
ro
xi
es
. 
T
he
 M
an
ag
em
en
t 
B
oa
rd
 s
ha
ll
 a
rr
an
ge
 f
or
 t
he
 a
pp
oi
nt
m
en
t 
o
f a
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
e 
to
 e
xe
rc
is
e 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
 v
ot
in
g 
ri
gh
ts
 i
n 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
it
h 
in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
; 
th
is
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
e 
sh
ou
ld
 a
ls
o 
be
 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
du
ri
ng
 t
he
 G
en
er
al
 M
ee
ti
ng
. 
9)
 
T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 s
ho
ul
d 
m
ak
e 
it 
po
ss
ib
le
 f
or
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
to
 f
ol
lo
w
 t
he
 G
en
er
al
 M
ee
ti
ng
 u
si
ng
 m
od
em
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 m
ed
ia
 (
in
te
rn
et
).
 
I 0
) 
T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
's
 t
re
at
m
en
t 
o
f a
ll 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
 in
 r
es
pe
ct
 t
o 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
m
us
t 
be
 e
qu
al
. 
A
ll 
ne
w
 f
ac
ts
 m
ad
e 
kn
ow
n 
to
 f
in
an
ci
al
 a
na
ly
st
s 
an
d 
si
m
il
ar
 a
dd
re
ss
ee
s 
sh
al
l 
al
so
 b
e 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
to
 t
he
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
by
 t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 w
it
ho
ut
 d
el
ay
. 
II
) 
S
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
in
fo
rm
ed
 a
bo
ut
 f
in
an
ci
al
 p
os
it
io
n 
by
 c
on
so
li
da
te
d 
fi
na
nc
ia
l 
st
at
em
en
ts
. 
T
he
y 
m
ay
 b
e 
ad
di
ti
on
al
ly
 i
nf
or
m
ed
 b
y 
m
ea
ns
 o
f 
ha
lf
-y
ea
r,
 i
nt
er
im
 o
r 
qu
ar
te
rl
y 
re
po
rt
s 
as
 w
el
l. 
T
H
E
 N
E
T
H
E
R
L
A
N
D
S
 N
O
T
E
S:
 
1)
 
In
 f
or
m
ul
at
in
g 
th
e 
co
de
, 
th
e 
C
om
m
it
te
e 
ha
s 
ba
se
d 
it
se
lf
 o
n 
th
e 
ex
is
ti
ng
 l
eg
is
la
ti
on
 g
ov
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
ex
te
rn
al
 a
nd
 i
nt
er
na
l 
re
la
ti
on
s 
o
f 
lis
te
d 
co
m
pa
ni
es
, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
e 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n 
go
ve
rn
in
g 
th
e 
m
an
da
to
ry
 a
pp
li
ca
ti
on
 o
f t
he
 t
w
o-
ti
er
 b
oa
rd
 s
ys
te
m
 a
nd
 t
he
 c
as
e 
la
w
 o
n 
co
rp
or
at
e 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
. 
2)
 
S
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
m
ay
 t
ak
e 
le
ga
l 
ac
ti
on
 s
uc
h 
as
 s
ta
rt
in
g 
an
 i
nq
ui
ry
 o
r 
an
nu
al
 a
cc
ou
nt
 p
ro
ce
du
re
. 
3)
 
G
oo
d 
co
rp
or
at
e 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 r
eq
ui
re
s 
th
e 
fu
ll
y-
fl
ed
ge
d 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
o
f s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
in
 d
ec
is
io
n 
m
ak
in
g 
in
 t
he
 g
en
er
al
 m
ee
ti
ng
 o
f s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s.
 
It
 is
 i
n 
th
e 
in
te
re
st
 o
f t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 th
at
 a
s 
m
an
y 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
 a
s 
po
ss
ib
le
 t
ak
e 
pa
rt
 in
 t
he
 d
ec
is
io
n 
m
ak
in
g.
 
T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 s
ha
ll
, 
in
 s
o 
fa
r 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 g
iv
e 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
 
th
e 
op
po
rt
un
it
y 
to
 v
ot
e 
by
 p
ro
xy
 a
nd
 t
o 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
e 
w
it
h 
al
l 
ot
he
r 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
. 
4)
 
T
he
 g
en
er
al
 m
ee
ti
ng
 o
f t
he
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
ab
le
 to
 e
xe
rt
 s
uc
h 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
on
 t
he
 p
ol
ic
y 
o
f 
th
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
bo
ar
d 
an
d 
th
e 
su
pe
rv
is
or
y 
bo
ar
d 
o
f t
he
 
co
m
pa
ny
 t
ha
t 
it 
pl
ay
s 
a 
fu
ll
y-
fl
ed
ge
d 
ro
le
 i
n 
th
e 
sy
st
em
 o
f c
he
ck
s 
an
d 
ba
la
nc
es
 o
f 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
. 
5)
 
T
he
 g
en
er
al
 m
ee
ti
ng
 o
f a
 c
om
pa
ny
 N
O
T
 h
av
in
g 
a 
tw
o-
ti
er
 s
ta
tu
s 
m
ay
 p
as
s 
a 
re
so
lu
ti
on
 to
 c
an
ce
l 
th
e 
bi
nd
in
g 
na
tu
re
 o
f a
 n
om
in
at
io
n 
fo
r 
th
e 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t 
o
f a
 
m
em
be
r 
o
f t
he
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
bo
ar
d 
or
 o
f t
he
 s
up
er
vi
so
ry
 b
oa
rd
 a
nd
/o
r 
a 
re
so
lu
ti
on
 to
 d
is
m
is
s 
a 
m
em
be
r 
o
f t
he
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
bo
ar
d 
or
 o
f t
he
 s
up
er
vi
so
ry
 b
oa
rd
 
by
 a
n 
ab
so
lu
te
 m
aj
or
it
y 
o
f t
he
 v
ot
es
 c
as
t. 
(I
V
.l
.l
) 
6)
 
A
ny
 d
ec
is
io
ns
 o
f t
he
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
bo
ar
d 
on
 a
 m
aj
or
 c
ha
ng
e 
sh
al
l 
be
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 t
he
 a
pp
ro
va
l 
o
f t
he
 g
en
er
al
 m
ee
ti
ng
 o
f t
he
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s.
 
7)
 
D
ep
os
it
or
y 
re
ce
ip
ts
 f
or
 s
ha
re
s 
ar
e 
a 
m
ea
ns
 o
f p
re
ve
nt
in
g 
a 
(c
ha
nc
e)
 m
in
or
it
y 
o
f s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
fr
om
 c
on
tr
ol
li
ng
 t
he
 d
ec
is
io
n 
m
ak
in
g 
pr
oc
es
s 
as
 a
 r
es
ul
t o
f 
ab
se
nt
ee
is
m
 a
t a
 g
en
er
al
 m
ee
ti
ng
 o
f s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s.
 D
ep
os
it
or
y 
re
ce
ip
ts
 f
or
 s
ha
re
s 
sh
al
l 
no
t 
be
 u
se
d 
as
 a
n 
an
ti
-t
ak
eo
ve
r 
m
ea
su
re
. 
8)
 
T
he
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
bo
ar
d 
or
 w
he
re
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 th
e 
su
pe
rv
is
or
y 
bo
ar
d 
sh
al
l 
pr
ov
id
e 
al
l 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
 (
an
d 
ot
he
r 
pa
rt
ie
s 
in
 t
he
 f
in
an
ci
al
 m
ar
ke
ts
) 
w
it
h 
eq
ua
l 
an
d 
si
m
ul
ta
ne
ou
s 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t 
m
at
te
rs
 t
ha
t 
m
ay
 i
nf
lu
en
ce
 s
ha
re
 p
ri
ce
. 
9)
 
T
he
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
bo
ar
d 
an
d 
su
pe
rv
is
or
y 
bo
ar
d 
sh
al
l 
pr
ov
id
e 
th
e 
ge
ne
ra
l 
m
ee
ti
ng
 o
f s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
w
it
h 
al
l 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
th
at
 it
 r
eq
ui
re
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
ex
er
ci
se
 o
f i
ts
 
po
w
er
s.
 
1 0
) 
If
 p
ri
ce
-s
en
si
ti
ve
 i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
is
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
du
ri
ng
 a
 g
en
er
al
 m
ee
ti
ng
 o
f s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s,
 o
r 
th
e 
an
sw
er
in
g 
o
f s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
qu
es
ti
on
s 
ha
s 
re
su
lt
ed
 i
n 
th
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
o
f p
ri
ce
-s
en
si
ti
ve
 i
nf
or
m
at
io
n,
 t
hi
s 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
al
l 
be
 m
ad
e 
pu
bl
ic
 w
it
ho
ut
 d
el
ay
. 
11
) 
P
ro
vi
si
on
s 
fo
r 
al
l 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
 to
 f
ol
lo
w
 m
ee
ti
ng
s 
an
d 
pr
es
en
ta
ti
on
s 
in
 r
ea
l 
ti
m
e 
by
 m
ea
ns
 o
f w
eb
 c
as
ti
ng
 o
r 
te
le
ph
on
e 
w
it
h 
pr
es
en
ta
ti
on
s 
po
st
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
's
 w
eb
si
te
 a
ft
er
w
ar
ds
. 
12
) 
T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 s
ha
ll
 p
la
ce
 a
ll 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
re
qu
ir
ed
 to
 b
e 
pu
bl
is
he
d 
on
 t
he
ir
 w
eb
si
te
. 
13
) 
R
es
po
ns
ib
il
it
y 
o
f 
in
st
it
ut
io
na
l 
in
v
es
to
rs
-
sh
al
l 
ac
t 
pr
im
ar
il
y 
in
 t
he
 i
nt
er
es
ts
 o
f t
he
 u
lt
im
at
e 
be
ne
fi
ci
ar
ie
s 
or
 i
nv
es
to
rs
 a
nd
 h
av
e 
a 
re
sp
on
si
bi
li
ty
 to
 t
he
 u
lt
im
at
e 
be
ne
fi
ci
ar
ie
s 
or
 i
nv
es
to
rs
 a
nd
 t
he
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 i
n 
w
hi
ch
 t
he
y 
in
ve
st
, 
to
 d
ec
id
e,
 i
n 
a 
ca
re
fu
l 
an
d 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
t w
ay
, w
he
th
er
 th
ey
 w
is
h 
to
 e
xe
rc
is
e 
th
ei
r 
ri
gh
ts
 a
s 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r 
o
fl
is
te
d
 c
om
pa
ni
es
. 
14
) 
In
st
it
ut
io
na
l 
in
ve
st
or
s 
sh
al
l 
be
 p
re
pa
re
d 
to
 e
nt
er
 i
nt
o 
di
al
og
ue
 w
it
h 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 i
f t
he
y 
do
 n
ot
 a
cc
ep
t 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
's
 e
xp
la
na
ti
on
 o
f 
no
n-
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
o
fb
es
t 
pr
ac
ti
ce
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
o
f t
hi
s 
co
de
. 
T
he
 g
ui
di
ng
 p
ri
nc
ip
le
 i
n 
th
is
 c
on
ne
ct
io
n 
is
 t
he
 r
ec
og
ni
ti
on
 t
ha
t 
co
rp
or
at
e 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 r
eq
ui
re
s 
a 
ta
il
or
-m
ad
e 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 a
nd
 
th
at
 it
 i
s 
pe
rf
ec
tl
y 
po
ss
ib
le
 f
or
 a
 c
om
pa
ny
 to
 ju
st
if
y 
in
st
an
ce
s 
o
f n
on
-a
pp
li
ca
ti
on
 o
f i
nd
iv
id
ua
l 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
. 
15
) 
C
od
e 
fu
rt
he
r 
re
qu
ir
es
 I
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
al
 i
nv
es
to
rs
 to
 p
ub
li
sh
 o
n 
th
ei
r 
w
eb
si
te
s 
th
ei
r 
po
li
cy
 o
n 
ex
er
ci
si
ng
 v
ot
in
g 
ri
gh
ts
 f
or
 s
ha
re
s 
th
ey
 h
ol
d 
in
 l
is
te
d 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 a
nd
 
ho
w
 t
he
y'
ve
 i
m
pl
em
en
te
d 
th
ei
r 
po
li
cy
. 
T
he
 C
od
e 
sp
ec
if
ie
s 
th
at
 th
e 
co
m
m
it
te
e 
fe
el
s 
th
at
 th
e 
le
gi
sl
at
or
 h
as
 a
n 
im
po
rt
an
t c
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
to
 m
a
k
e
-
in
 s
om
e 
ca
se
s 
th
e 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n 
re
qu
ir
ed
 t
o 
re
dr
es
s 
th
e 
ba
la
nc
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
co
rp
or
at
e 
bo
di
es
 i
s 
ab
se
nt
, 
w
he
re
as
 i
n 
ot
he
r 
ca
se
s 
ex
is
ti
ng
 l
eg
al
 r
ul
es
 a
ct
ua
ll
y 
ob
st
ru
ct
 th
is
. 
In
 th
e 
co
m
m
it
te
e'
s 
op
in
io
n,
 l
eg
is
la
ti
on
 i
n 
th
e 
fi
el
d 
o
f a
nt
i-
ta
ke
ov
er
 m
ea
su
re
s,
 f
ac
il
it
at
io
n 
o
f p
ro
xy
 v
ot
in
g,
 a
nd
 c
ro
ss
-b
or
de
r 
vo
ti
ng
 a
re
 o
f g
re
at
es
t 
im
po
rt
an
ce
 to
 c
or
po
ra
te
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e.
 
S
ug
ge
st
 th
at
 th
e 
le
gi
sl
at
or
 
co
ns
id
er
 s
cr
ap
pi
ng
 th
e 
ob
li
ga
ti
on
 to
 a
pp
ly
 th
e 
st
at
ut
or
y 
tw
o-
ti
er
 r
ul
es
 a
s 
th
ey
 i
m
pe
de
 c
or
po
ra
te
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e.
 
A
ls
o 
cl
ai
m
 th
at
 a
 f
un
da
m
en
ta
l 
ch
an
ge
 i
n 
at
ti
tu
de
 is
 
re
qu
ir
ed
 f
ro
m
 m
an
y 
in
st
it
ut
io
na
l 
in
ve
st
or
s 
w
ho
 s
ho
ul
d 
m
ak
e 
m
uc
h 
m
or
e 
ex
te
ns
iv
e 
us
e 
o
f t
he
ir
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
 r
ig
ht
s 
to
 t
ak
e 
co
rr
ec
ti
ve
 a
ct
io
n.
 
*T
he
 c
om
m
it
te
e 
ha
s 
sc
ra
pp
ed
 th
e 
be
st
 p
ra
ct
ic
e 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
n 
pr
ox
y 
vo
ti
ng
 in
 t
he
 d
ef
in
it
e 
co
de
 a
s 
it 
is
 fo
r 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 n
ot
 p
os
si
bl
e 
to
 a
pp
ly
 t
he
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
as
 l
on
g 
as
 n
at
io
na
l a
n
d
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
le
J;
is
la
to
rs
 h
av
e 
no
t l
eJ
;a
ll
yf
ac
il
it
at
ed
 p
ro
xy
 v
ot
in
g 
by
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s.
 
S
W
IT
Z
E
R
L
A
N
D
 N
O
T
E
S
: 
1)
 
2)
 
3)
 
4)
 
5)
 
T
he
 q
ue
st
io
n 
o
f c
ap
it
al
 s
tr
uc
tu
re
 a
nd
 p
ar
ti
cu
la
rl
y 
th
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
e 
o
f o
ne
 s
ha
re
 o
ne
 v
ot
e 
re
qu
es
te
d 
by
 i
nv
es
to
rs
 a
re
 n
ot
 p
ar
t 
o
f t
he
 S
w
is
s 
C
od
e.
 
C
or
po
ra
te
 G
ov
er
na
nc
e 
in
 S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d 
is
 g
ov
er
ne
d 
by
 S
w
is
s 
co
m
pa
ny
 a
nd
 s
to
ck
-e
xc
ha
ng
e 
la
w
 a
nd
 h
av
e 
N
O
T
 b
ee
n 
su
ff
ic
ie
nt
ly
 t
ak
en
 i
nt
o 
co
ns
id
er
at
io
n.
 
A
s 
in
ve
st
or
s,
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
ha
ve
 t
he
 f
in
al
 d
ec
is
io
n 
w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
. 
T
he
 p
ow
er
s 
o
f s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
ar
e 
de
fi
ne
d 
by
 s
ta
tu
te
. 
T
he
y 
al
on
e 
ar
e 
en
ti
tl
ed
 to
 m
ak
e 
de
ci
si
on
s 
w
it
h 
re
ga
rd
 t
o 
pe
rs
on
ne
l 
m
at
te
rs
 a
t 
th
e 
to
p 
o
f t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 
le
ve
l 
(e
le
ct
in
g 
an
d 
gr
an
ti
ng
 r
el
ea
se
 to
 m
em
be
rs
 o
ft
h
e 
B
oa
rd
 o
fD
ir
ec
to
rs
 a
nd
 a
pp
oi
nt
in
g 
th
e 
au
di
to
rs
),
 t
he
 f
in
al
 a
pp
ro
va
l 
o
f a
cc
ou
nt
s 
an
d 
po
li
cy
 o
n 
di
st
ri
bu
ti
on
s 
to
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
eq
ui
ty
 (
di
vi
de
nd
s,
 i
nc
re
as
e 
or
 d
ec
re
as
e 
in
 c
ap
it
al
).
 
T
he
y 
al
so
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
th
e 
A
rt
ic
le
s 
o
f A
ss
oc
ia
ti
on
 a
nd
 t
he
ir
 a
pp
ro
va
l 
is
 
re
qu
ir
ed
 f
or
 d
ec
is
io
ns
 o
n 
m
er
ge
rs
, 
de
-m
er
ge
rs
, 
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 A
rt
ic
le
s.
 
S
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
ex
er
ci
se
 t
he
ir
 r
ig
ht
s 
at
 t
he
 G
en
er
al
 S
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
M
ee
ti
ng
 a
nd
 h
av
e 
th
e 
ri
gh
t 
to
 m
ak
e 
m
ot
io
ns
 o
n 
it
em
s 
pr
es
cr
ib
ed
 i
n 
th
e 
ag
en
da
. 
T
he
y 
m
ay
 a
ls
o 
re
qu
es
t 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 c
om
pa
ny
 m
at
te
rs
 n
ot
 i
nc
lu
de
d 
on
 t
he
 a
ge
nd
a.
 
6)
 
In
st
it
ut
io
na
l 
in
ve
st
or
s,
 n
om
in
ee
s 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
in
te
rm
ed
ia
ri
es
 e
xe
rc
is
in
g 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
 r
ig
ht
s 
in
 t
he
ir
 o
w
n 
na
m
e 
sh
ou
ld
 e
ns
ur
e,
 a
s 
fa
r 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 t
ha
t 
be
ne
fi
ci
al
 
ow
ne
rs
 m
ay
 e
xe
rc
is
e 
th
ei
r 
in
fl
ue
nc
e 
as
 t
o 
ho
w
 s
uc
h 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r 
ri
gh
ts
 a
re
 b
ro
ug
ht
 to
 b
ea
r.
 
7)
 
W
he
re
 r
eg
is
te
re
d 
sh
ar
es
 a
cq
ui
re
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
cu
st
od
ia
n 
ba
nk
s,
 th
e 
la
tt
er
 s
ho
ul
d 
in
vi
te
 t
he
 p
ar
ty
 a
cq
ui
ri
ng
 th
e 
sh
ar
es
 to
 a
pp
ly
 f
or
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n 
in
 t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
's
 
R
eg
is
te
r 
o
f 
S
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s.
 
8)
 
T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 s
ha
ll
 e
nd
ea
vo
ur
 to
 f
ac
il
it
at
e 
th
e 
ex
er
ci
se
 o
f s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
st
at
ut
or
y 
ri
gh
ts
. 
9)
 
T
he
 A
rt
ic
le
s 
o
f A
ss
oc
ia
ti
on
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 a
va
il
ab
le
 i
n 
w
ri
ti
ng
 o
r 
in
 e
le
ct
ro
ni
c 
fo
rm
 a
t 
an
y 
ti
m
e.
 
I 0
) 
T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 s
ho
ul
d 
en
su
re
 t
ha
t 
th
e 
G
en
er
al
 S
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
M
ee
ti
ng
 i
s 
us
ed
 a
s 
a 
fo
ru
m
 f
or
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
so
 t
ha
t 
it 
is
 w
el
l-
in
fo
rm
ed
 i
n 
di
sc
ha
rg
in
g 
its
 
fu
nc
ti
on
 a
s 
th
e 
hi
gh
es
t c
or
po
ra
te
 a
ut
ho
ri
ty
. 
T
he
 B
oa
rd
 o
f D
ir
ec
to
rs
 s
ho
u
ld
 i
nf
or
m
 t
he
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
in
 s
uc
h 
a 
w
ay
 t
he
y 
ca
n 
ex
er
ci
se
 t
he
ir
 r
ig
ht
s 
in
 t
he
 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
o
f t
he
 e
ss
en
ti
al
 b
as
is
 o
f t
he
ir
 d
ec
is
io
ns
. 
T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 s
ho
ul
d,
 w
he
n 
co
nv
en
in
g 
m
ee
ti
ng
s,
 p
ro
vi
de
 c
on
ci
se
 e
xp
la
na
ti
on
s 
on
 a
ge
nd
a 
it
em
s 
an
d 
on
 
m
ot
io
ns
 p
ut
 f
or
w
ar
d 
by
 th
e 
B
oa
rd
 o
f 
D
ir
ec
to
rs
. R
eq
ue
st
s 
by
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
to
 p
la
ce
 i
te
m
s 
on
 t
he
 a
ge
nd
a 
an
d 
m
ot
io
ns
 m
ad
e 
by
 t
he
m
 s
ho
ul
d,
 i
f 
re
ce
iv
ed
 i
n 
tim
e,
 
be
 o
ff
ic
ia
ll
y 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
ed
. 
I I
) 
T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 s
ho
ul
d 
fa
ci
li
ta
te
 t
he
 p
ar
ti
ci
pa
ti
on
 o
f s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
at
 G
en
er
al
 M
ee
ti
ng
 b
y 
cl
ea
rl
y 
se
tt
in
g 
da
te
s 
an
d 
ti
m
e 
li
m
it
s 
w
el
l 
in
 a
dv
an
ce
. 
12
) 
T
he
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
o
f t
he
 m
ee
ti
ng
 s
ho
ul
d 
en
ab
le
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
to
 m
ak
e 
re
le
va
nt
 a
nd
 c
on
ci
se
 c
om
m
en
ts
 o
n 
ag
en
da
 i
te
m
s.
 
13
) 
A
rr
an
ge
m
en
ts
 s
ho
u
ld
 b
e 
m
ad
e 
to
 e
ns
ur
e 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r 
ri
gh
ts
 t
o 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
an
d 
in
sp
ec
ti
on
 a
re
 m
et
. 
14
) 
T
he
 B
oa
rd
 o
f D
ir
ec
to
rs
 s
ho
ul
d 
ap
po
in
t a
 p
os
it
io
n 
fo
r 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r 
re
la
ti
on
s 
in
 o
rd
er
 to
 i
nf
or
m
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
on
 t
he
 p
ro
gr
es
s 
o
f 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
ye
ar
. 
15
) 
In
 G
en
er
al
 S
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
M
ee
ti
ng
 t
he
 w
il
l 
o
f t
he
 m
aj
or
it
y 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
cl
ea
rl
y 
an
d 
fa
ir
ly
 e
xp
re
ss
ed
. 
16
) 
T
he
 B
oa
rd
 o
f D
ir
ec
to
rs
 s
ho
ul
d 
ta
ke
 s
te
ps
 t
o 
co
nt
ac
t 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
 i
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
S
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
M
ee
ti
ng
s.
 S
ho
ul
d 
ap
po
in
t a
 p
os
it
io
n 
fo
r 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r 
re
la
ti
on
s.
 
17
) 
C
om
pa
ni
es
 w
it
h 
ac
ti
ve
 m
aj
or
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
(i
nc
lu
di
ng
 s
ub
si
di
ar
ie
s 
li
st
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
st
oc
k 
ex
ch
an
ge
) 
m
ay
 a
da
pt
 o
r 
si
m
pl
if
Y
 t
he
 g
ui
de
li
ne
s.
 
S
uc
h 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
sh
ou
ld
 i
m
pl
em
en
t 
in
 t
he
ir
 o
w
n 
w
ay
 a
n 
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
t 
fo
r 
th
e 
as
se
ss
m
en
t 
o
f t
he
 e
xt
er
na
l 
au
di
t, 
a 
fu
nc
ti
on
al
ly
 e
ff
ic
ie
nt
 i
nt
er
na
l 
co
nt
ro
l 
sy
st
em
, 
th
e 
re
m
un
er
at
io
n 
po
li
cy
 f
or
 m
em
be
rs
 o
f t
he
 B
oa
rd
 o
f 
D
ir
ec
to
rs
 a
nd
 E
xe
cu
ti
ve
 M
an
ag
em
en
t 
an
d 
th
e 
su
cc
es
si
on
 p
la
nn
in
g 
fo
r 
th
e 
B
oa
rd
 o
f D
ir
ec
to
rs
. 
S
W
X
-D
ir
ec
ti
ve
 o
n 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
R
el
at
in
g 
to
 C
or
po
ra
te
 G
ov
er
na
nc
e 
(S
W
X
 S
w
is
s 
E
xc
ha
ng
e)
: 
• 
T
he
 f
ol
lo
w
in
g 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 g
ro
up
 s
tr
uc
tu
re
 a
nd
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
m
us
t 
be
 d
is
cl
os
ed
 i
f l
is
te
d 
on
 t
he
 S
W
X
: 
• 
G
ro
up
 S
tr
uc
tu
re
-
de
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
o
f t
he
 i
ss
ue
rs
 o
pe
ra
ti
on
al
 g
ro
up
 s
tr
uc
tu
re
; 
al
l 
li
st
ed
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 b
el
on
gi
ng
 to
 t
he
 g
ro
up
; t
he
 n
on
-l
is
te
d 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
be
lo
ng
in
g 
to
 t
he
 g
ro
up
. 
• 
S
ig
ni
fi
ca
nt
 S
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s
-
to
 t
he
 e
xt
en
t t
ha
t 
th
e 
is
su
er
 is
 a
w
ar
e 
o
f t
he
m
. 
• 
C
ro
ss
-s
ha
re
ho
ld
in
gs
-
th
at
 e
xc
ee
d 
5%
 o
f t
he
 c
ap
it
al
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
in
gs
 o
r 
vo
ti
ng
 r
ig
ht
s 
on
 b
ot
h 
si
de
s.
 
• 
S
ha
re
s 
an
d 
P
ar
ti
ci
pa
ti
on
 C
er
ti
fi
ca
te
s
-
nu
m
be
r,
 t
yp
e 
an
d 
pa
r 
va
lu
e;
 a
ls
o 
m
ai
n 
fe
at
ur
es
 s
uc
h 
as
 e
nt
it
le
m
en
t 
to
 d
iv
id
en
d 
pa
ym
en
ts
, 
vo
ti
ng
 r
ig
ht
s,
 
pr
ef
er
en
ti
al
 r
ig
ht
s 
an
d 
si
m
il
ar
 r
ig
ht
s.
 
• 
C
on
ve
rt
ib
le
 b
on
ds
 &
 o
pt
io
ns
-
ou
ts
ta
nd
in
g 
an
d 
nu
m
be
r 
o
f o
pt
io
ns
 i
ss
ue
d 
al
on
g 
w
it
h 
in
di
ca
ti
on
 o
f t
he
 d
ur
at
io
n,
 e
xe
rc
is
e 
pr
ic
e 
an
d 
su
bs
cr
ip
ti
on
 r
at
io
. 
• 
S
ha
re
ho
ld
er
 P
ar
ti
ci
pa
ti
on
 R
ig
ht
s
-
vo
ti
ng
 r
ig
ht
s 
re
st
ri
ct
io
ns
 a
nd
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
n
; s
ta
tu
to
ry
 q
uo
ru
m
s;
 c
on
vo
ca
ti
on
 o
f t
he
 g
en
er
al
 m
ee
ti
ng
 o
f t
he
 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
. 
• 
A
ge
nd
a
-
ru
le
s 
fo
r 
ad
di
ng
 i
te
m
s 
o
f s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s,
 e
sp
ec
ia
ll
y 
ru
le
s 
on
 d
ea
dl
in
es
. 
• 
R
eg
is
tr
at
io
n 
in
 t
he
 s
ha
re
 r
eg
is
te
r
-
ru
le
s 
on
 t
he
 d
ea
dl
in
e 
fo
r 
re
gi
st
ra
ti
on
 i
n 
co
nn
ec
ti
on
 w
it
h 
at
te
nd
in
g 
th
e 
ge
ne
ra
l 
m
ee
ti
ng
 a
s 
w
el
l 
as
 r
ul
es
 o
n 
m
ak
in
g 
ex
ce
pt
io
ns
. 
A
p
p
en
d
ix
 I
V
-
N
ot
es
 o
n 
th
e 
La
tin
 S
ys
te
m
 
F
R
A
N
C
E
 N
O
T
E
S
: 
I)
 
B
oa
rd
 o
f D
ir
ec
to
rs
 r
ep
re
se
nt
s 
al
l 
o
f t
he
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s.
 
It
 is
 c
ol
le
ct
iv
el
y 
re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
fo
r 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 o
f 
its
 a
ss
ig
nm
en
ts
 t
o 
w
hi
ch
 i
t a
ss
um
es
 b
y 
st
at
ut
e 
th
e 
es
se
nt
ia
l 
re
sp
on
si
bi
li
ti
es
: 
it 
ca
ll
s 
th
e 
m
ee
ti
ng
s 
an
d 
se
ts
 t
he
 a
ge
nd
a,
 a
pp
oi
nt
s 
an
d 
di
sm
is
se
s 
th
e 
ch
ai
rm
an
 a
nd
 c
hi
ef
 e
xe
cu
ti
ve
 o
ff
ic
er
s,
 s
up
er
ci
se
s 
th
ei
r 
m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
de
te
rm
in
es
 th
e 
an
nu
al
 a
cc
ou
nt
s 
an
d 
re
po
rt
s 
on
 i
ts
 a
ct
io
n 
in
 t
he
 a
nn
ua
l 
re
po
rt
. 
2)
 
M
ee
ti
ng
 o
f t
he
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
is
 a
 d
ec
is
io
n 
m
ak
in
g 
bo
dy
. 
3)
 
O
pp
or
tu
ni
ty
 f
or
 g
en
ui
ne
 a
nd
 o
pe
n 
di
sc
us
si
on
 w
ith
 t
he
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s.
 
4)
 
D
ir
ec
to
rs
 s
ho
ul
d 
at
te
nd
 t
he
 m
ee
ti
ng
. 
5)
 
W
he
n 
co
rp
or
at
io
n 
is
 c
on
tr
ol
le
d 
by
 a
 m
aj
or
it
y 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r 
(o
r 
gr
ou
p 
o
f s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
ac
ti
ng
 i
n 
co
nc
er
t)
, 
th
e 
la
tt
er
 a
ss
um
es
 a
 s
pe
ci
fi
c 
re
sp
on
si
bi
li
ty
 t
o 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
, 
w
hi
ch
 i
s 
di
re
ct
 a
nd
 s
ep
ar
at
e 
fr
om
 t
he
 B
oa
rd
 o
f D
ir
ec
to
rs
. 
T
ha
t 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r 
m
us
t 
ta
ke
 p
ar
ti
cu
la
r 
ca
re
 t
o 
av
oi
d 
po
ss
ib
le
 c
on
fl
ic
ts
 o
f i
nt
er
es
t, 
to
 s
ec
ur
e 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
pr
ov
id
ed
 t
o 
m
ar
ke
t,
 a
nd
 t
o 
ta
ke
 a
ll 
in
te
re
st
s 
in
to
 a
cc
ou
nt
 f
ai
rl
y.
 
6)
 
R
at
he
r 
th
an
 s
ee
ki
ng
 t
o 
pr
ov
id
e 
sp
ec
if
ic
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
fo
r 
m
in
or
it
y 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
, 
th
e 
be
st
 f
or
m
ul
a 
co
ns
is
ts
 o
f a
pp
oi
nt
in
g 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t d
ir
ec
to
rs
 i
n 
co
nt
ro
ll
ed
 c
or
po
ra
ti
on
s 
in
 
th
e 
pr
op
or
ti
on
s 
de
fi
ne
d 
by
 t
hi
s 
se
t o
f p
ri
nc
ip
le
s.
 
IT
A
L
Y
 N
O
T
E
S
: 
I)
 
A
do
pt
io
n 
o
f a
nd
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
ith
 t
hi
s 
C
or
po
ra
te
 G
ov
er
na
nc
e 
C
od
e 
ar
e 
vo
lu
nt
ar
y.
 
2)
 
B
oa
rd
 o
f D
ir
ec
to
rs
 s
ha
ll
 u
se
 i
ts
 b
es
t 
ef
fo
rt
s 
fo
r 
en
su
ri
ng
 t
ha
t 
ac
ce
ss
 to
 t
he
 i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
e 
is
su
er
 th
at
 i
s 
m
at
er
ia
l 
fo
r 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
 is
 t
im
el
y 
an
d 
ea
sy
 to
 a
cc
es
s,
 s
o 
as
 t
o 
al
lo
w
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
an
 i
nf
or
m
ed
 e
xe
rc
is
e 
o
f t
he
ir
 r
ig
ht
s.
 
3)
 
T
he
 i
ss
ue
r 
sh
al
l 
es
ta
bl
is
h 
a 
sp
ec
if
ic
 s
ec
ti
on
 o
n 
its
 i
nt
er
ne
t 
si
te
 t
ha
t 
m
ay
 b
e 
ea
si
ly
 i
de
nt
if
ie
d 
an
d 
ac
ce
ss
ed
 w
he
re
 t
he
 i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
is
 a
va
il
ab
le
; 
sh
ou
ld
 i
nc
lu
de
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
fo
r 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
an
d 
ex
er
ci
se
 o
f v
ot
in
g 
ri
gh
ts
 i
n 
th
e 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
 m
ee
ti
ng
s 
as
 w
el
l 
as
 d
oc
um
en
ta
ti
on
 r
el
at
in
g 
to
 i
te
m
s 
on
 t
he
 a
ge
nd
a 
o
f t
he
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
m
ee
ti
ng
s.
 
4)
 
B
oa
rd
 o
f D
ir
ec
to
rs
 s
ha
ll
 e
ns
ur
e 
a 
pe
rs
on
 is
 i
de
nt
if
ie
d 
as
 r
es
po
ns
ib
le
 f
or
 h
an
dl
in
g 
re
la
ti
on
sh
ip
s 
w
ith
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s.
 
5)
 
B
oa
rd
 o
f D
ir
ec
to
rs
 s
ha
ll 
us
e 
its
 b
es
t e
ff
or
ts
 f
or
 e
ns
ur
in
g 
th
at
 th
e 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
 r
ec
ei
ve
 a
de
qu
at
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
el
em
en
ts
 f
or
 t
he
m
 t
o 
ta
ke
 i
n 
an
 i
nf
or
m
ed
 
m
an
ne
r 
th
e 
de
ci
si
on
s 
th
at
 a
re
 t
he
 c
om
pe
te
nc
e 
o
f t
he
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
m
ee
ti
ng
s.
 
6)
 
R
ef
er
en
ce
 t
he
 l
eg
al
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
pr
ot
ec
ti
ng
 th
e 
ri
gh
ts
 o
f 
m
in
or
it
ie
s 
th
at
 r
eq
ui
re
 m
in
im
um
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
es
 to
 b
e 
fi
xe
d 
fo
r 
th
e 
ex
er
ci
se
 o
f v
ot
in
g 
ri
gh
ts
 a
nd
 t
he
 p
re
ro
ga
ti
ve
s 
o
f 
m
in
or
it
ie
s,
 t
he
 C
om
m
it
te
e 
re
co
m
m
en
ds
 t
ha
t d
ir
ec
to
rs
 s
ho
ul
d 
re
gu
la
rl
y 
as
se
ss
 t
he
 d
es
ir
ab
il
it
y 
o
f a
da
pt
in
g 
su
ch
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
es
 in
 l
in
e 
w
ith
 t
he
 e
vo
lu
ti
on
 o
f t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
's
 s
iz
e 
an
d 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r 
st
ru
ct
ur
e.
 
7)
 
It
 i
s 
no
t 
th
e 
re
sp
on
si
bi
li
ty
 o
f t
he
 c
om
m
it
te
e 
to
 t
ak
e 
in
to
 c
on
si
de
ra
ti
on
 t
he
 b
eh
av
io
ur
s 
o
f 
in
st
it
ut
io
na
l 
in
ve
st
or
s.
 H
ow
ev
er
, i
t i
s 
o
f t
he
 o
pi
ni
on
 t
ha
t 
th
e 
ac
kn
ow
le
dg
em
en
t 
by
 
th
em
 o
f 
th
e 
im
po
rt
an
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
co
rp
or
at
e 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 r
ul
es
 c
on
ta
in
ed
 in
 t
he
 c
od
e 
m
ay
 r
ep
re
se
nt
 a
 s
ig
ni
fi
ca
nt
 e
le
m
en
t 
fo
r 
th
e 
pu
rp
os
e 
o
f a
 m
or
e 
co
nv
in
ce
d 
w
id
es
pr
ea
d 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
o
f 
th
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f t
he
 C
od
e 
by
 t
he
 i
ss
ue
rs
. 
S
P
A
IN
 N
O
T
E
S
: 
I)
 
O
ne
 o
f 
th
e 
m
ai
n 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 o
f c
or
po
ra
te
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
is
 t
o 
en
ha
nc
e 
th
e 
ro
le
 o
f t
he
 S
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
M
ee
ti
ng
 a
s 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
's
 b
as
ic
 d
ec
is
io
n-
m
ak
in
g 
an
d 
ov
er
si
gh
t b
od
y 
an
d 
as
 
th
e 
gu
ar
di
an
 o
f 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
 i
nt
er
es
ts
. 
2)
 
T
he
 S
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
M
ee
ti
ng
 m
us
t 
pr
ov
id
e 
th
e 
m
os
t e
ff
ic
ie
nt
 v
eh
ic
le
 f
or
 s
uc
h 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n,
 e
na
bl
in
g 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
 w
ho
 d
o 
no
t 
at
te
nd
 t
he
 m
ee
ti
ng
 to
 b
e 
re
pr
es
en
te
d 
an
d 
to
 
vo
ic
e 
th
ei
r 
in
te
re
st
s 
th
ro
ug
h 
pr
ox
ie
s.
 
3)
 
O
n 
th
e 
oc
ca
si
on
 o
f S
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
M
ee
ti
ng
, t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 m
us
t 
di
sc
lo
se
 t
he
 f
ul
l 
co
nt
en
t o
f a
ll 
th
e 
m
ot
io
ns
 t
o 
be
 s
ub
m
it
te
d 
to
 t
he
 M
ee
ti
ng
 o
n 
its
 o
w
n 
w
eb
 s
ite
 r
eg
ar
dl
es
s 
o
f 
ot
he
r 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 e
st
ab
li
sh
ed
 b
y 
la
w
. 
4)
 
O
th
er
 m
ea
su
re
s 
in
cl
ud
e 
ex
te
nd
in
g 
th
e 
pe
ri
od
 o
f a
dv
an
ce
 n
ot
ic
e 
o
f t
he
 M
ee
ti
ng
 a
nd
 a
t e
na
bl
in
g 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
, 
su
bj
ec
t t
o 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n 
re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
, t
o 
ap
pl
y 
to
 i
nc
lu
de
 i
te
m
s 
in
 
th
e 
ag
en
da
 o
f 
th
e 
co
nv
en
ed
 m
ee
ti
ng
 a
nd
 p
ro
po
se
 a
lt
er
na
te
 m
ot
io
ns
 s
uf
fi
ci
en
tl
y 
in
 a
dv
an
ce
 o
f t
he
 S
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
M
ee
ti
ng
 s
o 
th
at
 th
e 
bo
ar
d 
ca
n 
de
fi
ne
 i
ts
 p
os
it
io
n 
ab
ou
t 
w
he
th
er
 o
r 
no
t 
th
ey
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 p
ub
li
sh
ed
, 
st
at
in
g 
th
e 
re
as
on
s 
fo
r 
no
n-
in
cl
us
io
n;
 o
r 
im
pl
em
en
t 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
sy
st
em
s 
fo
r 
an
 e
le
ct
ro
ni
c 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
n 
o
f t
he
 q
uo
ru
m
, 
an
d 
th
e 
gr
an
ti
ng
 o
f p
ro
xi
es
 a
nd
 v
ot
in
g 
by
 p
os
t o
r 
el
ec
tr
on
ic
 m
ea
ns
. 
5)
 
F
ac
il
it
ie
s 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
pr
ov
id
ed
 to
 i
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
al
 i
nv
es
to
rs
 (
m
ut
ua
l 
fu
nd
s,
 f
in
an
ci
al
 i
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
s,
 o
th
er
 i
nt
er
m
ed
ia
ri
es
) 
w
hi
ch
 r
ep
re
se
nt
 t
he
 i
nt
er
es
ts
 o
f n
um
er
ou
s 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
 
an
d 
in
ve
st
or
s 
to
 e
na
bl
e 
th
em
 t
o 
co
nt
ri
bu
te
 m
or
e 
ac
ti
ve
ly
 i
n 
co
rp
or
at
e 
de
ci
si
on
s.
 
B
ec
au
se
 o
f t
he
 g
ro
w
in
g 
im
po
rt
an
ce
 o
f 
in
st
it
ut
io
na
l 
in
ve
st
or
s'
 p
ar
ti
ci
pa
ti
on
 in
 c
om
pa
ni
es
' 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p 
st
ru
ct
ur
es
, 
it 
is
 r
ec
om
m
en
de
d 
th
at
 t
he
y 
de
fi
ne
 a
nd
 d
is
cl
os
e 
th
ei
r 
po
li
cy
 o
n 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
in
 t
he
 d
ec
is
io
ns
 o
f c
om
pa
ni
es
 in
 w
hi
ch
 t
he
y 
ha
ve
 i
nv
es
te
d 
an
d 
th
at
 t
hi
s 
de
fi
ni
ti
on
 b
e 
m
ad
e 
kn
ow
n 
an
d 
no
ti
fi
ed
 t
o 
fi
na
l 
in
ve
st
or
s.
 
A
p
p
en
d
ix
 V
 -
N
o
te
s 
on
 t
he
 J
ap
an
es
e 
S
ys
te
m
 
JA
P
A
N
 N
O
T
E
S
: 
I)
 
T
he
 p
ri
va
te
 p
ro
pe
rt
y 
sy
st
em
 is
 o
ne
 w
hi
ch
 a
ll 
pr
op
er
ty
 is
 r
ec
og
ni
ze
d 
as
 b
ei
ng
 o
w
ne
d 
by
 s
om
eo
ne
 w
ho
 h
as
 t
he
 r
ig
ht
 to
 c
on
tr
ol
 t
ha
t 
pr
op
er
ty
, 
bu
t 
w
ho
 m
us
t a
ls
o 
be
ar
 th
e 
re
sp
on
si
bi
li
ty
 f
or
 a
ny
 c
on
se
qu
en
ce
s 
o
f t
ha
t c
on
tr
ol
. 
T
he
 o
w
ne
r 
m
us
t 
be
ar
 r
es
po
ns
ib
il
it
y 
fo
r 
al
l 
su
ch
 e
ve
nt
ua
li
ti
es
, 
fo
r 
be
tt
er
 o
r 
fo
r 
w
or
se
. 
2)
 
T
he
 d
ri
vi
ng
 f
or
ce
 b
eh
in
d 
th
e 
ec
on
om
ie
s 
o
f a
dv
an
ce
d 
ca
pi
ta
li
st
 c
ou
nt
ri
es
 i
s,
 i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l, 
th
e 
la
rg
e 
pu
bl
ic
 s
to
ck
 c
or
po
ra
ti
on
, 
w
hi
ch
 is
 o
w
ne
d 
by
 a
 m
ul
ti
tu
de
 o
f s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s.
 
U
nd
er
 t
hi
s 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
t 
w
he
re
 t
he
re
 i
s 
su
ch
 a
 v
as
t 
nu
m
be
r 
o
f p
eo
pl
e 
ha
vi
ng
 o
w
ne
rs
hi
p 
in
te
re
st
, 
it 
is
 e
ss
en
ti
al
ly
 i
m
po
ss
ib
le
 f
or
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
to
 d
ir
ec
tl
y 
m
an
ag
e 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
. 
T
he
re
fo
re
, 
th
e 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
 i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l 
m
ee
ti
ng
 a
pp
oi
nt
 t
he
 d
ir
ec
to
rs
 o
f t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
, a
nd
 t
he
 b
oa
rd
 o
f d
ir
ec
to
rs
 i
s 
en
tr
us
te
d 
w
it
h 
m
an
ag
em
en
t. 
3)
 
A
 c
om
pa
ny
 is
 t
he
 e
co
no
m
ic
 p
ro
pe
rt
y 
o
f i
ts
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s.
 E
ve
n 
w
he
n 
th
e 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
 h
av
e 
a 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 s
ys
te
m
 i
n 
pl
ac
e,
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
th
at
 i
gn
or
e 
ec
on
om
ic
al
 o
r 
ef
fi
ci
en
cy
 i
ss
ue
s 
w
it
h 
re
sp
ec
t 
to
 t
he
 u
se
 o
f p
re
ci
ou
s 
ec
on
om
ic
 r
es
ou
rc
es
 w
ill
 n
ot
 b
e 
to
le
ra
te
d.
 
A
 f
ix
ed
 s
et
 o
f r
eg
ul
at
io
ns
 i
s 
re
qu
ir
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
, 
an
d 
in
 o
rd
er
 to
 
se
cu
re
 t
he
se
, 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 is
 o
f 
ut
m
os
t 
im
po
rt
an
ce
. 
A
s 
st
oc
ks
 a
re
 p
ub
li
cl
y 
li
st
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
m
ar
ke
t,
 it
 is
 d
es
ir
ab
le
 t
ha
t 
th
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
ta
ke
s 
pl
ac
e 
un
de
r 
th
e 
w
at
ch
fu
l 
ey
e 
o
f 
th
e 
pu
bl
ic
. 
T
he
se
 k
in
ds
 o
f r
eg
ul
at
io
ns
 a
re
 p
ar
ti
cu
la
rl
y 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
fo
r 
la
rg
e-
sc
al
e 
pu
bl
ic
 c
om
pa
ni
es
. 
4)
 
T
he
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
en
te
r 
in
to
 a
 c
on
tr
ac
tu
al
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
w
ith
 e
xe
cu
ti
ve
 m
an
ag
er
s;
 it
 i
s 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
es
e 
ob
li
ga
ti
on
s 
th
at
 t
he
 d
is
ci
pl
in
e 
by
 t
he
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
is
 i
m
po
se
d.
 
5)
 
S
ig
ni
fi
ca
nc
e 
o
fl
n
v
es
to
r 
R
el
at
io
ns
-
th
e 
cr
ea
ti
on
 o
f s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
 v
al
ue
 l
ie
s 
in
 c
on
ti
nu
al
ly
 d
ev
el
op
in
g 
go
od
 i
nv
es
tm
en
t o
pp
or
tu
ni
ti
es
, a
nd
 i
n 
fo
ll
ow
in
g 
th
ro
ug
h 
w
ith
 
op
po
rt
un
it
ie
s;
 e
xe
cu
ti
ve
 m
an
ag
er
s 
m
us
t 
be
 a
ct
iv
e 
in
 p
ro
vi
di
ng
 i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
to
 t
he
 s
to
ck
 m
ar
ke
t;
 I
t 
is
 i
m
pe
ra
ti
ve
 t
ha
t 
ex
ec
ut
iv
e 
m
an
ag
er
s 
st
ri
ve
 to
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
e 
w
ith
 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
, 
in
ve
st
or
s 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
pe
op
le
 r
el
at
ed
 w
ith
 t
he
 m
ar
ke
t a
nd
 e
nd
ea
vo
ur
 to
 c
re
at
e 
tr
us
t. 
(i
f t
he
 i
nv
es
to
rs
 d
o 
no
t 
tr
us
t 
th
e 
ex
ec
ut
iv
e 
m
an
ag
er
s,
 t
he
 v
al
ue
 o
f t
he
 s
to
ck
 
w
ill
 n
ot
 r
is
e)
 
6)
 
A
dd
re
ss
in
g 
S
ha
re
ho
ld
er
 D
er
iv
at
iv
e 
L
it
ig
at
io
n
-
T
he
 l
it
ig
at
io
n 
co
m
m
it
te
e 
sh
ou
ld
 a
ss
es
s 
w
he
th
er
 to
 c
om
m
en
ce
 l
it
ig
at
io
n 
ag
ai
ns
t d
ir
ec
to
rs
 o
r 
ex
ec
ut
iv
es
 in
 r
es
pe
ct
 o
f w
ho
m
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 o
r 
th
e 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
 h
av
e 
m
ad
e 
a 
cl
ai
m
, 
to
 h
ol
d 
th
em
 r
es
po
ns
ib
le
 f
or
 t
he
ir
 c
on
du
ct
. 
7)
 
T
he
 g
en
er
al
 m
ee
ti
ng
 o
f t
he
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
is
 i
m
po
rt
an
t b
ec
au
se
 it
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
an
 o
pp
or
tu
ni
ty
 f
or
 t
ho
se
 p
eo
pl
e 
w
ho
 h
av
e 
in
ve
st
ed
 in
 t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
's
 s
ha
re
s 
to
 p
ar
ti
ci
pa
te
 in
 t
he
 
de
ci
si
on
-m
ak
in
g 
pr
oc
es
s,
 to
 t
ak
e 
pa
rt
 in
 c
or
po
ra
te
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e,
 t
o 
ob
ta
in
 i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t 
th
e 
cu
rr
en
t 
st
at
e 
o
f t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
, t
o 
ev
al
ua
te
 t
he
 q
ua
li
fi
ca
ti
on
s 
o
f t
he
 e
xe
cu
ti
ve
 
bo
ar
d.
 
It
 a
ls
o 
pr
ov
id
es
 a
n 
op
po
rt
un
it
y 
fo
r 
th
e 
ex
ec
ut
iv
e 
to
 r
ep
or
t 
on
 t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
's
 a
ch
ie
ve
m
en
ts
; 
If
 th
e 
ex
ec
ut
iv
es
 a
re
 u
na
bl
e 
to
 a
ns
w
er
 A
N
Y
 q
ue
st
io
n 
fr
om
 a
n 
in
ve
st
or
 a
t 
th
e 
ge
ne
ra
l 
m
ee
ti
ng
 o
f t
he
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s,
 a
 f
ul
l 
an
d 
ac
cu
ra
te
 a
ns
w
er
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 f
or
th
co
m
in
g 
on
 t
he
 c
om
pn
ay
's
 w
eb
 p
ag
e 
w
ith
in
 a
 f
ix
ed
 p
er
io
d 
o
f t
im
e.
 
